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73 
Understanding the Market for Celebrity: 
An Economic Analysis of the Right of 
Publicity 
Vincent M. de Grandpré * 
INTRODUCTION 
For those who seek to use celebrity identity for commercial 
purposes, the law of publicity remains as complex and confusing as 
ever, even if much, perhaps too much, has already been written on 
the topic.  The difficulty begins with the fact that there is no single 
right of publicity in the United States today.  To the extent that 
human identity is protected against unauthorized commercial use, it 
is under state law.1  In addition, adjudication in this area of the law 
remains notoriously inconsistent.  Some courts focus on the affront 
suffered by those who are unwillingly associated with someone 
elses commercial pursuit,2 while others sanction an infringers 
unjust enrichment.3  At other times still, judges emphasize an 
infringers unfair competition against the plaintiff,4 the need to offer 
 
*  Associate-in-Law, Columbia University School of Law (1998-2000); LL.M. 2000 
(Columbia); B.C.L. & LL.B 1996 (McGill).  I thank Jane Ginsburg, Alice Haemmerli and 
Avery Katz for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.  Of course, all 
mistakes and opinions expressed herein remain mine. 
 1 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3, at 1-2 
(2d ed. 2001) (the right of publicity, the right to control the commercial use of [ones] 
identity is a state-law created intellectual property right whose infringement is a 
commercial tort of unfair competition.).  According to McCarthy, half of the states have 
some form of right of publicity.  See id. at § 6:1, at 6-5.  Human identity is also protected by 
the Fourth Amendment under the rubric of constitutional privacy, and by state privacy laws.  
See id. § 5:52-5:55, at 5-94 to 5-102.  Constitutional privacy focuses on government 
interference, however, while I am most interested in unauthorized uses of identity by private 
parties. 
 2 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992); Hoffman v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873 (C.D. Cal. 1999); and Onassis v. 
Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
 3 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977); 
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 134 (2d Cir. 1984); and Lugosi v. Universal 
Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J., dissenting). 
 4 See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575; Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 438. 
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incentives to performers and celebrities generally,5 and even the risk 
of consumer confusion.6  It seems, however, that no single policy can 
explain all right of publicity cases, and disagreements about the 
relative merits of these justifications most certainly influence trial 
courts assessments of the legality of unauthorized uses of identity.  
One federal appellate panel even expressed doubts about the very 
rationale for the right.7 
Courts also seem to disagree about the likelihood and extent of 
injuries that result from unauthorized uses of celebrity identity.8  As 
a result, there is little certainty about the legality of a whole range of 
unauthorized expressive uses of celebrity likeness.9  At the same 
time, a debate continues to rage in academic journals about the 
legality and importance of recoding, i.e., transformative uses of 
cultural symbols by an audience, for their own communicative 
purposes.10  So-called postmodern authors argue that celebrity 
 
 5 See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (right of performance); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 
15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Assn, 805 F.2d 663, 678 (7th Cir. 1986) (right of performance); and Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 
441 (Bird, J., dissenting). 
 6 See, e.g., State ex rel. Elvis Presley Intl Meml Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 
99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).  Risk of consumer confusion is not necessary to prove right of 
publicity infringement, however, see Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 
419 (1983). 
 7 See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).  
The holding of Factors was legislatively overruled by TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 
(1995). 
 8 Compare Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 95 F.3d 959, 969 
(10th Cir. 1996) or Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) with White v. Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).  The professional letter turner was 
eventually awarded $403,000 in damages.  See CA Fed. Jury Awards Vanna White $403,000 
over Robot Ad, ENT. LITIG. REP., Feb. 25, 1994. 
 9 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publg., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000) 
(involving limited edition prints of golfer Tiger Woods at the 1997 Masters tournament 
sold by sports painter Rick Rush). 
 10 On recoding, see generally Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and 
Audience Recoding Rights  Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: 
Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805 (1993), 
(citing Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual 
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1863 (1991) (recoding is 
a set of subcultural practices and activities in which the consumption of commodified 
representational forms is a productive activity in which people engage in meaning-making 
to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas.)); and Justin Hughes, Recoding 
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999).  By 
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persona11 should be part of the public domain, available for all to 
recode, particularly if these activities have a profound significance 
for the producers and consumers of recoded social symbols.12 
The confusion surrounding the right of publicity has been 
unsettling for those who seek to use celebrity identity nationwide.  
The multiplicity of rights of publicity has led trademark practitioners 
to propose federal legislation on the subject matter.13  It is feared that 
a lack of uniformity in state laws chills commercial uses of celebrity 
identity and favors forum shopping.14  These concerns are 
 
transformative uses of human identity, I mean uses that are different from, and supersede, 
the plaintiffs use, if any, of his personality.  In the context of copyright law, see 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (The central purpose of this 
investigation is to see, in Justice Storys words, whether the new work merely supersede[s] 
the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose 
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message (citation 
omitted)); and Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) (The [transformative] use must employ the quoted matter in a 
different manner or for a different purpose from the original.). 
 11 Persona is the personality that a person (as an actor or politician) projects in public, 
and identity, the distinguishing character or personality of an individual (last visited Dec. 
18, 2001).  See MERRIAM-WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.m-
w.com.  I use the terms persona and identity interchangeably. 
 12 Two articles stand out in their postmodern critique of the right of publicity: David 
Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1982); and 
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993). 
 13 See INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, DRAFT PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
LEGISLATION (Proposal to Amend the Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Sept. 30, 1996) 
(draft since withdrawn pending further research); Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-
Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 209 (1998); and more specifically Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right of 
Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183 (1998); and Alice 
Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 477 
(1999).  The lack of uniformity of the right of publicity across states may worry some, as 
others were concerned about the multiplicity of state trademark dilution statutes before the 
Lanham Act was amended by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 1125(c), 1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).  
Others are also concerned about the interface between the federal Copyright Act and state 
rights of publicity.  See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Intl, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 14 See Jacqui Gold Grunfeld, Docudramas: The Legality of Producing Fact-Based 
Drama  What Every Producers Attorney Should Know, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
483, 509-11 (1992) (discussing Elizabeth Taylors action against ABC for planning a 
docudrama about her life). 
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understandable: the general principles of fairness and equity that 
fostered the emergence of the right of publicity must give way, in 
their maturity, to more certain legal rules.  The right of publicity is in 
need of a theoretical model, and assessing right of publicity 
infringements on criteria of unjust enrichment or fair rewards is 
unlikely to yield consistent case law. 
Economics can go a long way towards making sense of the right of 
publicity because the rationale for the right of publicity is to offer 
incentives to celebrities and others to market their identity.  In fact, 
the only decision of the United States Supreme Court on the right of 
publicity indicates that economics would shore up our understanding 
of how to balance this right with third-party speech.  In Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting,15 the Court explored the 
constitutional limits of the right of publicity.  By contrast with the 
right of privacy which protects reputation, with the same overtones 
of mental distress as in defamation, the Court wrote, the States 
interest in permitting a right of publicity is in protecting the 
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage 
such entertainment.16  The Court held that like copyright and patent, 
the right of publicity provides an incentive for him [Zacchini] to 
make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to 
the public.17 Although the Zacchini Court also alluded to the need to 
reward performers for their trade, its reasoning, which focused on the 
need to offer incentives, implied that a plaintiffs fair rewardor a 
defendants unjust enrichmenthad to be assessed in light of the 
right of publicitys instrumental function.18 
 
 15 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 16 Id. at 573. 
 17 Id. at 576. 
 18 See id. at 573-76. (Ohios decision to protect petitioners right of publicity here rests 
on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his 
act.).  Note that the Supreme Courts jurisdictional posture in Zacchini may have affected 
what the Court allowed itself to say about the right of publicity.  The trial court had found 
for the plaintiff, but the Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court had reversed, 
holding that whatever right the plaintiff had, a television station had a privilege to report 
matters of public interest.  But [i]nsofar as the Ohio Supreme Court held that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution required judgment for 
respondent, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565-66.  The 
scope of the Zacchini holding is also unclear.  Unlike most right of publicity cases, Zacchini 
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In this regard, the failure of American courts to heed the 
suggestion of the Supreme Court is largely responsible for the 
diversity of outcomes in right of publicity cases.  Although case law 
is replete with references to unjust enrichment,19 regrettably few 
judges pause to consider the incentives structure facing performers, 
celebrities and right of publicity plaintiffs generally.  Yet, what is 
unjust in the context of the commercial exploitation of persona 
depends on too many factors to be decided without careful 
consideration of a plaintiffs situation.20  To be helpful, claims of 
unfairness must be unbundled, that is to say that claims about the 
distributive consequences of particular activities must be informed 
by a close scrutiny of the market in which injustice is alleged to have 
occurred.21 
Surprisingly perhaps, few economic analysts of the law have 
studied the right of publicity.  Of those who have, Mark Gradys 
effort clearly stands out as the most detailed.22  Building on his work, 
 
did not involve an unauthorized use of identity for promotional purposes, but a performance 
which, as the Court pointed out, is perhaps the strongest case for the right of publicity.  
See Douglas G. Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1186-87 (1978) (arguing that 
rights of performance cases should really be distinguished from other right of publicity 
cases). 
 19 See, e.g., Carson v. Heres Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir. 
1983) (Kennedy, J. dissenting); and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 
(2d Cir. 1978).  See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First 
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 59-62 (1994) 
(discussing the prominence of the unjust enrichment rationale in publicity theory). 
 20 As Douglas G. Baird wrote about misappropriation: 
It is more than a little distressing to find in many of the opinions that adopt natural 
rights theory a statement to the effect that [t]he controlling question . . . is whether 
the commercial practice at issue is fair or unfair.  If the only limit on the 
plaintiffs right were whether or not the grant of relief would be fair, judges would 
have little guidance other than their own subjective perceptions of what was good. 
See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International 
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 419-20 (1983) (footnote 
omitted).  Indeed, it is not always transparent what courts consider unfair in third-party 
exploitation of the plaintiffs identity. 
 21 Furthermore, to the extent that the law forbids unauthorized uses of identity to 
prevent undue enrichment, the rules of right of publicity infringement should account for the 
fact that media organizations also profit from their exploitation of human identity. 
 22 See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA  
ENT. L. REV. 97 (1994).  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
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I also present an economic analysis of the right of publicity, 
attempting to assess whether the current rules foster efficiency or 
not.23 Economics may also help us understand the evolution of the 
right of publicity in the last one hundred years or so, from not being 
recognized at all, to being recognized as an inalienable personal 
right, to becoming, in many jurisdictions, a form of property.24 
To be sure, economic reasoning does not account for all the 
considerations that legal experience has deemed relevant in 
analyzing right of publicity cases, and I do not wish to belittle the 
importance of moral discourse.  To the contrary, clarifying oft-cited 
economic arguments would allow the rest of the right of publicity 
debate to proceed more tractably.  Irrespective of our views about the 
proper scope of this right, most of us have become sensitive to the 
logic of markets.  Economic arguments have become so common in 
the analysis of property rights that any pragmatic conception of the 
right of publicity stands to be influenced by efficiency 
considerations. 
I present my argument in the following manner.  Part II of this 
paper summarizes the current scope of the right of publicity, 
emphasizing both the inconsistencies of the current case law and the 
 
49 (5th ed. 1998); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 
(1978); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:7, at 2-19 to 2-22; and JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, 
FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 245-57 (1996). 
 23 Efficiency describes an allocation of resources that maximizes aggregate economic 
value.  Aggregate value refers to the sum of individual value, as measured by how much 
people are willing to pay for the use of a resource.  See POSNER, supra note 22, THE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, at 13. 
 24 Economic theory holds that a property right over a resource only arises if the costs 
associated with changing from a scheme of common to private property are outweighed by 
the benefits expected from privatization.  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967).  What accounts for this cost-benefit 
shift in the last century?  On this matter, a theory that will not work is the circular one that 
the right of publicity should be protected because human identity is valuable, as evidenced 
by the publics willingness to purchase identity-rich goods and services.  On the one hand, 
this theory does not explain the evolution in the legal protection of identity.  On the other 
hand, the marketplace for identity presupposes the right of publicity.  But how could we 
justify this right in the first place?  See Douglas G. Baird, supra note 18, and Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463  (9th Cir. 1988). See also Madow, supra note 12, at 148-79 
(discussing the evolution of public attitude towards unauthorized use of a celebritys 
likeness). 
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obvious limitations of the standard condition of right of publicity 
infringement, namely that the defendants use of the plaintiffs 
identity must be commercial in nature.  Having shown that the 
right of publicity is in need of a theoretical model, I go on in Part III 
to develop an economic model of the right of publicity.  After 
looking briefly at the theory of property rights and the market for 
celebrity identity, Part III emphasizes that unauthorized uses of 
celebrity identity not only result in congestion externalities but also 
account for powerful network effects.  Indeed, well known 
celebrities acquire secondary meanings and become, quite literally, 
figures of speech.  Moreover, celebrity markets are plagued with 
high transaction costs that may prevent the production of celebrity-
rich, socially valuable goods and services, particularly of the 
recoding type.  As a result, Part III underscores that the current 
right of publicity is overbroad.  Instead, the law should grant every 
person a property right in her identity; but if she is a celebrity and her 
persona has acquired secondary meaning, she should only recover if 
the unauthorized use of her identity is deceptive or directly competes 
with her own use, without being transformative.  In addition, the law 
should consider whether the plaintiff and defendant could have 
agreed to the allegedly infringing use if the defendant had sought 
authorization or whether transaction or coordination costs would 
have prevented that transaction.  Finally, Part IV dwells on the 
distributive consequences of the rules proposed here.  To the extent 
that an efficient right of publicity would be perceived as unfair 
because it allows third parties to benefit economically from a 
persons fame, Part IV suggests that celebrity identity should be 
protected by a liability rather than a property rule. 
Of course, this is not the first article written about the right of 
publicity.  Yet, no one, to my knowledge, has attempted to explain 
the right of publicity in economic terms to the extent proposed here.  
Further, this article attempts to develop a language to allow both 
friends and foes of the right of publicity to speak to one another, 
particularly with respect to the phenomenon of recoding.  In this 
respect, I hope that I can, in my own limited way, pursue the type of 
discussion that Michael Madow initiated in 1993 and that has 
continued since then to challenge us. 
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II. A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity is the right of any person to prevent others 
from using her identity for commercial purposes.25  The elements of 
this cause of action usually are: (1) the defendants use of the 
plaintiffs identity; (2) the appropriation of the plaintiffs name, 
likeness or distinguishing characteristics to the defendants 
advantage, usually commercial; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting 
injury.26  Although some might consider this definition overbroad, 
the right of publicity has expanded in all jurisdictions, since its 
inception in the 1950s, to protect the amorphous concept of human 
identity.27  To be sure, much state legislation28 declares that the 
right of publicity is only infringed if certain personal attributes 
name, voice or pictureare used.  But the list of these protected 
 
 25 Everyone, not only celebrities, has a right of publicity. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 
1, §§ 4.1 and 4.3, at 4-5 to 4-7.  Because of the economics of litigation, however, only 
celebrities are likely to rely on the right of publicity.  Be that as it may, I use the term 
celebrities to describe any person whose identity is of value to others. 
 26 See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417-18 (Under 
California law, a direct connection must [also] be alleged between the use and the 
commercial purpose.).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 
(1995).  Section 46 states: One who appropriates the commercial value of a persons 
identity by using without consent the persons name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for 
purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 
48 and 49. 
 27 We owe to Judge Frank of the Second Circuit the modern description of the right of 
publicity as a form of property.  See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 
F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).  Before then, courts relied on the right of privacy to protect 
individuals from the unauthorized use of their name or likeness.  Given that the imperatives 
of commerce have played such a crucial role in the development of the right of publicity as 
property, an analysis of the economics of the market for celebrity persona seems all the 
more appropriate. 
 28 In a significant number of American jurisdictions, the right of publicity is statutory in 
nature: see, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 & 51 and CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.  In some 
states, e.g. New York or Virginia, legislation is the only source of this right (see Stephano v. 
News Group Publns Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583 (N.Y. 1984); Falwell v. Penthouse Intl, 
Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (W.D. Va. 1981)), but not in all (see, e.g., Slivinsky v. 
Watkins-Johnson Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 799, 807 (1990) (California); Douglass v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois)).  By contrast, the right of publicity 
exists only at common law right in a number of other jurisdictions: this was the case of 
Ohio, for example.  See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 
(1977).  On the legal sources of the right of publicity, see generally Lorin L. Reisner, The 
Right of Publicity: History and Scope, 1999 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and 
Literary Property Course Handbook Series 574 PLI/Pat 725). 
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characteristics is expanding in most jurisdictions29 and has always 
been interpreted broadly and purposively.30  Furthermore, in answer 
to new forms of exploitation, the tendency of courts has been to hold 
that any depiction or act from which a person may be identified is an 
appropriation of identity, regardless of how the plaintiff is 
identified.31  Thus, subject to statutory language when applicable, 
courts have moved away from formulaic definitions of right of 
publicity infringement. 
Many courts have also lowered the threshold of misappropriation 
and sanctioned depictions that evoke a plaintiff rather than identify 
him.  For example, the depiction of a slightly modified racecar was 
held to infringe the drivers right of publicity even if his features 
were hidden by protective gear.32  In White v. Samsung Electronics, 
the Ninth Circuit held that there existed a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether the defendants humorous ad featuring a robot on a game 
 
 29 For example, the California statute was amended in 1984 to add voice and signature 
to name and likeness as personal attributes, which may not be appropriated without 
authorization.  See 1984 CAL. STAT., 1704, § 2.  Common law rights of publicity have also 
been defined increasingly broadly.  See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 
1994) (protecting stage identity). 
 30 See Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577, 579 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) 
(New sets of facts are continually arising to which accepted legal principles must be 
applied, and the novelty of the factual situation is not an unscalable barrier to such 
application of the law.).  In New York, for example, that the statute only covered portrait 
or picture and name did not prevent courts from issuing remedies against imitations by 
look-alike persons and manikins: see Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 
254 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (look-alike); and Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 
358 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (manikin). 
 31 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) ([i]t is 
not important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiffs identity, but whether the 
defendant has done so.  [. . .]  A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed 
only through the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges 
the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth.).  This tendency is particularly 
evident in the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, in their interpretation of California and Michigan 
law especially.  See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture  
The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA. 
J.L. & ARTS 129, 135 (1995); Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The Overextension of 
Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485, 494-95 
(1994); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307, 309 (N.Y. 1984); Allen v. Natl 
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); and Abdul-Jabbar v. General 
Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 32 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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show set, wearing a dress, jewelry and a wig, infringed the plaintiffs 
right of publicity.33  A court also allowed TV host Johnny Carson to 
obtain damages when a portable toilet provider included in its name 
the widely known phrase Heres Johnny by which Carson was 
introduced nightly on his show.34  Plaintiffs have even alleged, with 
mixed results, that their performing style had been infringed.35  The 
power conferred by the right of publicity has become all the more 
significant that evoking a celebrity today requires saying, writing or 
showing less and less.36  Although advertisers have used celebrities 
to sell goods and services at least since the 1700s,37 the twentieth 
century brought increased public familiarity with celebrities looks, 
acts and personal histories.  These trends have resulted in an 
expanding right of publicity, focused on the protection of the elusive 
concept of human identity.38  As one might guess, these 
developments have allowed celebrities to gain extensive control over 
the public use of their characteristic features. 
Not all unauthorized uses of a persons likeness amount to right of 
publicity infringement, however: subject to the applicable statutes, 
only advertisement and commercial uses trigger liability. 39  
Advertisement is generally defined as the solicitation of patronage 
intended to promote the sale of some collateral commodity or 
service, and may include not-for-profit ads.40  By contrast, 
 
 33 White, 971 F.2d 1395. 
 34 Carson v. Heres Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 35 Compare Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d. 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) with Lombardo v. 
Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (App. Div. 1977). 
 36 In Allen, the plaintiff was held to be recognizable from the defendants use in part 
because its ad displayed videotapes of movies about which the protagonist in one of Allens 
films had a fetish.  See Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 618.  Cf. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 103 
N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913), where the plaintiffs name probably had to be used in a photoplay 
so that the public could understand whom it featured.  Of course, the defendants use would 
probably be held privileged today. 
 37 Madow, supra note 12, at 148-49. 
 38 See id. at 177, 178. 
 39 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. Ch. 540.08 (1999); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 51 (1992); and 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/10 (2001).  This rule of law 
generally accords with the more limited scope of protection afforded by the First 
Amendment to commercial speech, i.e. speech that relates solely to the economic interests 
of the speaker and its audience. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service 
Commn, 447 U.S. 557, 561-566 (1980). 
 40 In New York, see Davis v. High Soc. Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (App. 
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commercial use is a more elusive concept.  At its simplest, it implies 
a use for profit, but the concept has evolved to mean uses not 
privileged in the interest of the public.41  Thus, publishers or 
broadcasters are generally sheltered from liability even though they 
too are profit-making entities.42 
At the heart of the public interest defense lies news reporting, 
which includes not only reporting on current events, but also stories 
of consumer interest, matters of scientific and biological interest 
and satire.43  In most jurisdictions, statutes themselves allow the use 
of a persons identity for news reporting or public affairs,44 but even 
when they do not, courts read a First Amendment exception into the 
law.45  Works of fiction, entertainment publications and broadcasts 
also receive a generous measure of First Amendment protection: in 
the words of the Tenth Circuit, [t]he line between the informing and 
the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right.46  
An ad incidental to a privileged use may also be privileged.47 
Beyond these general principles, however, defining when a 
particular use of identity is in the public interest, and therefore 
 
Div. 1982); Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co., 141 N.Y.S. 842, 843 (App. Div. 1913).  The law 
may have changed on this last point, however: see Beverley v. Choices Womens Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991).  In this case involving a hospital calendar, the 
Court of Appeals emphasized the for-profit character of the hospital, and the calendars 
clear promotional vocation.  See also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.11, at 8-95 (discussing 
the line between news, fiction and advertising). 
 41 See Davis v. High Soc. Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S. at 313-14. 
 42 See Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1982), and Falwell v. 
Penthouse, Intl Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1210. 
 43 See Stephano v. News Group Publns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 585 (N.Y. 1984); Finger 
v. Omni Publns Intl, 566 N.E.2d 141, 144 (N.Y. 1990); and Davis, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 315. 
 44 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (1999). 
 45 Under New York law, see Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584-85; Howell v. New York Post 
Co., 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993), affd, 619 N.E.2d 650 (N.Y. 1993).  The concepts of 
public interest and newsworthiness should also be defined broadly.  See Stephano, 474 
N.E.2d at 585. 
 46 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th 
Cir. 1996), (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).  See also Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 47 See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1984); and Booth v. 
Curtis Publg Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 743-44 (App. Div. 1962).  But see the dissent in 
Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (App. Div. 1975), affd, 352 N.E.2d 584 
(N.Y. 1976).  For more details, see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:11, at 7-19. 
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privileged, is not an easy task.  Generally speaking, non-authorized 
use of human persona is less likely to be privileged if it occurs in 
connection with goods rather than in the news or in the entertainment 
media.  For example, in Beverley v. Choices Womens Medical 
Center, Inc., the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply the 
public interest exception to a calendar illustrating important dates in 
the history of the womens movement, holding that the defendant 
was not a media enterprise.48  In another case, Rosemont 
Enterprises v. Urban Systems,49 a court held that a board game where 
players were required to answer questions about Howard Hughes 
life was not a biographical work in a different form; it was a 
commodity and an entertaining game of chance. 50  And these 
courts are hardly alone in their fear that medium-neutrality would 
result in the complete abridgment of the right of publicity.51 
Yet, other courts have applied the public interest defense without 
regard for the medium, focusing exclusively on the expressive 
content of the defendants activity rather than its form.52  News-
related goods, posters of athletes for example, have been held to be 
privileged.53  In a most remarkable case, a baseball players 
association sought to enjoin the defendant from selling trading cards 
 
 48 Beverly, 587 N.E.2d at 279. 
 49 Rosemont Enter. Inc. v. Urban Sys., 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973). 
 50 Law school socratic method fans might quarrel with the courts decision in Rosemont 
Enterprise: why are questions and answers not informative?  See also Ira J. Kaplan, They 
Cant Take That Away From Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images From Right of 
Publicity Claims,  18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37, 52-53 (1997); and Molony v. Boy Comics 
Publishers, Inc., 98 N.Y.S.2d 119, 123 (App. Div. 1950) (It does not follow that plaintiffs 
exploit has been fictionalized merely for the reason that it has been told through a form of 
picture-writing, which is as old as the human race.).  A similar reasoning could apply to the 
Rosemont case. 
 51 See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7, at 7-27 (arguing that the law should 
focus on the medium, not the message for fear of making the First Amendment the vehicle 
for legalizing commercial theft).  See also Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. 
Minn. 1970) (enjoining use of baseball players names and game statistics on a baseball 
table game); and Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1967) (enjoining use of professional golfers names). 
 52 See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 585 (It is the content of the article and not the 
defendants motive or primary motive to increase circulation which determines whether it is 
a newsworthy item, as opposed to a trade usage, under the Civil Rights Law.). 
 53 See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995).  But see 
Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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that parodied the plaintiffs members.54  The Tenth Circuit dismissed 
the view that the medium the defendant had chosen to trade in 
diminished its constitutional right to lampoon the players: The 
protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, have never 
been limited to newspapers and books.55  The Court went on to 
remark that the First Amendment had served to protect untraditional 
forms of expression such as flag burning, nude dancing, and 
wearing a jacket bearing the words Fuck the Draft.56  But if we 
ignore political speech, which knows almost no limits,57 the 
Cardtoons reasoning embodies a minority position. 
Although courts look more favorably upon unauthorized use of 
human persona in the entertainment and news media, media 
defendants are not entirely safe from liability either.  For example, 
courts have often re-characterized a defendants alleged fiction as 
disguised commercial exploitation, although the distinction between 
these two concepts is not always clear.58  With the same result, other 
courts have held that a defendants use of a plaintiffs likeness, 
seemingly in the public interest, has no real relationship to the 
article.59  A defendant may also be found to infringe the plaintiffs 
right of publicity if the former commits a fault in publishing false or 
fictitious information, even if the defendants use was otherwise in 
the public interest.60  Thus, unauthorized biographies that 
 
 54 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
 55 Id. at 969. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See, e.g., Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (Sup. Ct. 1968) 
(in which the court refused to award a remedy where a defendant had published a poster of 
the plaintiff, a comedian in the habit of running for President.)  See also Ellen Koteff, Pizza 
Hut Lampoons First Lady, But to Be the Big New Yorker, Youve Got to Be a Good Sport, 
NATIONS RESTAURANT NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, at 35 (discussing Pizza Huts advertisement 
featuring a Hillary Rodham Clinton look-alike). 
 58 Compare Geary v. Goldstein, 831 F. Supp. 269  (S.D.N.Y. 1993) with Frank v. Natl 
Broad. Co., Inc., 506 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App. Div. 1986). 
 59 See Murray v. N.Y. Magazine Co., 267 N.E.2d 256, 258 (N.Y. 1971).  But cf. 
Thompson v. Close-Up, Inc., 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 1950) (where a photo of the 
plaintiff was used in an article on the sale of illicit drugs, although the plaintiff had no 
connection with this field of activity) with Finger v. Omni Publns Intl, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 
141, 144 (N.Y. 1990) (questionably finding a real relationship between a picture of the 
plaintiffs family and the topic of experimental fertilization techniques). 
 60 In New York, at least, this type of right of publicity infringement follows the rules of 
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substantially fictionalize or deliberately falsify a persons life have 
been held to attract liability.61 
Furthermore, even media organizations cannot avoid paying the 
help if news or serious commentary is not involved, for their actions 
might then become advertisement in disguise.62  For example, in 
Grant v. Esquire63a federal district court held that a fashion 
magazine could not publish movie stars pictures modified to model 
clothes, without commentary or information.64 
In its only decided case on the right of publicity, the United States 
Supreme Court also denied immunity to a media organization.  In 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting,65 a television station 
presented on the evening news all fifteen seconds of Hugo Zacchinis 
human cannonball act.  The Court held that the television station had 
no constitutional privilege to appropriate the defendants 
performance and threaten his livelihood because his act was not 
otherwise a newsworthy event.66  While the Court acknowledged that 
its reasoning was imprecise, it added: 
 
defamation: a defendant may only infringe the right of publicity of a public figure or of a 
limited-purpose public figure if the defendant acted with malice. See Lerman v. Flynt 
Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 1984); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 
840, 842 (N.Y. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).  See also Eastwood v. 
Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 424 (1983). 
 61 Under New York law, see Spahn, 233 N.E.2d at 842; see also Hicks v. Casablanca 
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  The law in other states may vary: see 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8:73, at 8-107 (discussing fact, fiction and docudrama). 
 62 Advertisement in disguise is the name of the New York doctrine, which has 
functional equivalents in all states: See, e.g., Murray v. N.Y. Magazine Co., 267 N.E.2d 256, 
258 (N.Y. 1971); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.12, at 8-102.2. 
 63 Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 64 In a similar event, Life magazine published in 1989 a story about how Clark Gable 
would fare at the end of the century, complete with a picture of the cast of the television 
show, Magnum, P.I.  See JOSHUA GAMSON, CLAIMS TO FAME: CELEBRITY IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICA 51-53 (1994).  See also Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 
1973), where the court, reversing a grant of summary judgment for the defendant, found that 
a genuine issue of fact arose as to whether the plaintiff had been drawn out as a performer 
rather than merely photographed as a participant in a newsworthy event (the Woodstock 
festival). 
 65 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 66 Id. at 576. 
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[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be drawn 
between media reports that are protected and those that 
are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not immunize the media when they 
broadcast a performers entire act without his consent.67 
Moreover, although the Court recognized that entertainment 
benefited from constitutional protection, it also observed that 
Zacchini was not seeking to repress expression, but to be paid for 
it.68 
The Supreme Courts holding in Zacchini, in the context of a news 
bulletin, underscores the difficulty of applying the commercial use 
criterion of right of publicity infringement.  Not only is the 
expression commercial use not very enlightening, the Supreme 
Court certainly undermined the view that the medium of expression 
was determinative of the issue of infringement.  Yet, not only has the 
commercial use condition already proved to be unsatisfactory, as in 
Rosemont Enterprises or Beverley, it will become increasingly 
difficult to defend in years to come as more goods and services take 
the form of information.  A few examples may illustrate this point. 
In recent years, film studios have sought to pay for ballooning 
production costs by pushing product placement to a degree never 
seen before.69  Movies are a fantastic commercial medium: brand 
name products can be woven into a story, appear in a natural setting, 
be remembered for as long as the movie will be, and potentially 
 
 67 Id. at 574-75. 
 68 Id. at 578. 
 69 For an instructive account of consumer reactions to product placement, see Denise E. 
DeLorme and Leonard N. Reid, Moviegoers Experiences and Interpretation of Brands in 
Films Revisited, 28(2) J. OF ADVER. 71 (June 22, 1999).  See also Eric Harrison, Advertising 
Is So Much a Part of Life That Its Understandable to Find Familiar Products in Films. But 
Sometimes it Goes Too Far, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, at 4 (describing the extent of 
product placement in the recent movies, sometimes at the expense of the underlying story).  
Product placement has also attracted some legal academic commentary: see generally 
Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into 
Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301; Robert Adler, Heres Smoking at You, Kid: 
Has Tobacco Product Placement in the Movies Really Stopped?, 60 MONT. L. REV. 243 
(1999). 
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shape younger viewers aspirations and identity.70  As a news 
magazine put it: the cinema is the admans perfect settingno 
distractions, no way to change channels.71  Product placement on 
television is popular for the same reasons: it delivers advertising 
when viewers are most attentive.72 
Tied-marketing and licensing arrangements have also become an 
important source of revenue for movie producers.73  According to 
one estimate the producers of Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles had 
licensed over 200 products, earning in 1989 more than $350 
million.74  If entertainment and advertising are intertwined both on- 
and off-screen, to what extent can an easy distinction be made 
between commercial and non-commercial uses of celebrity 
identity?75 
 
 70 See DeLorme and Reid, supra note 69.  Most importantly, product placement can be 
awesomely lucrative: see Ruth La Ferla, For Fashion Designers, The Big Screen Becomes a 
Celluloid Runway, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, § 9, at 2 (discussing the use of Ray-Ban 
sunglasses by the lead roles in Men in Black which brought a sales increase that the 
company put at threefold); Stuart Elliott, Reeboks Suit over Jerry Maguire Shows Risks 
of Product Placement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at D2 (Sales of Reeses Pieces soared 
more than 70 percent post-E.T.). 
 71 Rocky the Salesman (Brand Name Advertising in Motion Pictures)  THE ECONOMIST, 
Apr. 20, 1991, at 70. 
 72 See generally Terry Lefton, You Cant Zap These Ads, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, 
March 26, 2001, available at http://www.thestandard.com (last visited Sept. 3, 2001) 
(describing product placement on TV show Survivor: The Australian Outback); Stuart 
Elliott, Real or Virtual? You Call It: Digital Sleight of Hand Can Put Ads Almost Anywhere, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at C1 (focusing on virtual ads that are also capable of fighting 
commercial flight). 
 73 See Louise Kramer, Tricon Promos Phantom Impact: Fast-Food Chains Alter Ads to 
Move Star Wars Toys, ADVER. AGE,  July 5, 1999, at 1 (The Star Wars deal stems from 
a reported $2 billion pact PepsiCo signed with Lucasfilm in 1996 that also included its 
Pepsi-Cola Co. and Frito-Lay units.  Tricon retained the link after PepsiCo spun it off in 
1997.).  See also Karen Hudes, Independent Film, But With a Catch: A Corporate Logo, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at A43 (discussing Tommy Hilfigers $10 million promotional 
campaign also advertising the movie The Faculty.  Not only did characters in the movie 
wear Hilfigers wardrobe, the movies cast was featured in TV commercials for Hilfiger. 
We think that film is very much our future here, said Hilfigers Marketing VP). 
 74 See Selling Americas Kids: Commercial Pressures on Kids of the 90s, at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/other/sellingkids/index.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). 
 75 The recently adopted CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2001) states in relevant part: 
(3) If a work that is protected under paragraph (2) [a play, book, magazine, newspaper, 
musical composition, audiovisual work, radio or television program, single and original 
work of art, work of political or newsworthy value, or an advertisement or commercial 
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The Italian clothes retailer Benetton is known for its United 
Colors of Benetton advertising campaign which, in its later phases, 
simply featured dramatic human events.  One such installment 
featured a gripping photograph of thousands of Albanians escaping 
from their disintegrating country on a precarious boat.  This ad 
simply consisted of a photograph and the Benetton trademark.  It is 
interesting to note that this advertisement would probably not be so 
characterized under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 & 51: it can 
easily be distinguished from the Beverley case because of the 
absence of laudatory terms.76  The publication of the ad 
contemporaneously with the events taking place in Albania also 
supports the claim that Benetton was trying to open the worlds eyes 
to the tragedy next door.  Of course, we all know what Benetton is 
and where to purchase Benetton goods, but this merely underscores 
that in the advertisers global market, less and less needs to be said to 
promote well known products.77  What is commercial use becomes 
 
announcement for any of these works,] includes within it a use in connection with a product, 
article of merchandise, good, or service, this use shall not be exempt under this subdivision, 
notwithstanding the unprotected uses inclusion in a work otherwise exempt under this 
subdivision, if the claimant proves that this use is so directly connected with a product, 
article of merchandise, good, or service as to constitute an act of advertising, selling, or 
soliciting purchases of that product, article of merchandise, good, or service by the deceased 
personality without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdivision (c).  
Assessing what is a commercial use of identity promises to become a more complicated 
task. 
 76 See Beverley v. Choices Womens Med. Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E. 2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 
1991). 
 77 See Stephen R. Barnett, Comment: The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in 
Advertising: Some Counterpoints to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
593, 597 n.20 (1996).  The author cites Richard Meares, Ad Man Defends Notorious 
Benetton Campaign, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Sept. 26, 1995, quoting Oliviero Toscani, 
creative director for publicity at Benetton, stating that There isnt a difference any more 
between advertising and editorial.  The distinctive style pioneered by Toscani, Creative 
Director at Tina Browns Talk magazine, has been imitated, for example in retailer Kenneth 
Coles Spring 2000 advertising campaign at http://www.kennethcole.com (last visited Sept. 
30, 2001) or in The Body Shops ads for its hemp line of products available at  
http://bodyshop.com/usa/interactivist/body-hemp.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2001).  See also 
Joanne Morreale and Karen Buzzard, The Serialized mini-Drama: A new Trend in 
Advertising, in ADVERTISING AND POPULAR CULTURE: STUDIES IN VARIETY AND 
VERSATILITY 94 (Sammy R. Danna ed., 1992) (discussing the publics response to a New 
England Telephone serialized drama type commercial. The featured actors became so well 
known locally that  people would stop them on the street and admonish them about how 
they handled the family crisis which was the central issue of the commercial). Custom 
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even more elusive in a postmodern culture where no clear line can be 
drawn between high culture and mass or popular culture, as well as 
between art and profit making.78 
Finally, any methodology focusing on the commercial status of the 
infringer or on the commercial character of the allegedly infringing 
expression will become increasingly difficult to apply on the 
Internet.  The problem had already arisen on television where, by 
contrast to the written medium, there is a more confusing continuum 
between commercial and non-commercial expression.79  This is only 
more so on the Internet, where entertainment, information and 
commercial expression are increasingly merging, particularly as 
bandwidth becomes cheaper.80  In this context, many uses will have 
 
publishing also presents similar difficult issues: see Alex Kuczynski, Big Tobaccos Newest 
Billboards Are on the Pages of Its Magazines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, § 1, at 1 
(describing the growth of custom publishing for tobacco companies). 
 78 See Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in MOVIES AND MASS 
CULTURE 185, 186 (John Belton ed., 1996) (describing postmodern culture in these terms).  
Consider, for example, that Keith Haring quickly opened a Pop Shop in New York upon 
becoming famous; the nature of his work also made it difficult to disentangle his art from its 
merchandizing.  See NEAL GABLER, LIFE THE MOVIE: HOW ENTERTAINMENT CONQUERED 
REALITY 133 (1998).  More recently, graffiti artist KAWS has made a name for himself by 
mingling his work with advertisement in public places.  How would the law react if the 
artist received some form of financial support from advertisers on whose boards he chose to 
draw? See Carly Berwick, Public Arts Redux, available at http://www.feedmag. 
com/essay/es303lofi.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2001).  See also Somini Sengupta, Marks 
from the Underground: The Graffiti Esthetic Surfaces in the Arts, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, 
at B1 (discussing the integration of 1980s graffiti artists into the art and corporate worlds).  
Consider also the case of ads for Bombay Gin where artists are recruited to design a martini 
glass, for the sake of advertising; see http://www.bombay.com/design (last visited Sept. 6, 
2000). 
 79 See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952). 
 80 See Patrick Allossery, A Turning Point for the Ad Industry, NATL POST, Jan. 14, 
2000, at C03 (quoting an ad executive saying about the AOL-Time Warner merger: With 
all their new media capability and all the products they, themselves, have to advertise, do 
you think that these companies will be satisfied with 30-second TV ads?  Our role as 
agencies will increasingly be to create non-linear ad content that is at the crossroads of 
movies and advertising.)  See also Stuart Elliott, When Dot-Coms Want to Build up Their 
Images, They Hitch Their Web Sites to a Star, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at C14 (quoting a 
New York advertising executive: The latest thing is the merging of commerce and 
entertainment to create content that consumers remember. . . . ); and Michael McCarthy, 
Dot-coms Look for Starring Roles in Product Placement, USA TODAY, Feb. 22, 2000, at 
10B (discussing the AOL-Warner Bros. cross promotion deal in/of the movie Youve Got 
Mail; a product placement executive is quoted as saying [t]he fact that AOL is buying 
Warner Bros. shows the Internet world appreciates the value of entertainment content.). 
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both expressive and commercial aspects. 
To sum up, not only has the definition of the right of publicity 
expanded in recent years to protect celebrity identity, the necessary 
criterion of infringement, commercial use, has become more difficult 
to apply.  The result of these trends is a right of publicity that is 
broader, and possibly shakier, than ever. 
III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A. The Theory of Property Rights 
As we all know, social life is premised on the view that the 
presence of others enhances our lives, at least sometimes.  From this 
reality, however, it follows that every society must adopt rules to 
minimize social costs and maximize the benefits of our gregarious 
life.  Hence, an important goal of any successful legal system is to 
promote efficiency, for example by minimizing the cost of accidents 
or maximizing the value of scarce resources like land.81 
Efficiency, however, is not achieved by preventing harm at any 
cost because precautions themselves are costly.  Thus, an efficient 
law must create incentives for people to reduce harm to themselves 
and others up only to the point where the expense of doing so equals 
the benefit to all third parties.  In the words of Robert Cooter, this 
marginal principle provides that social costs should be minimized 
by equating the incremental benefit of each precautionary activity to 
its incremental cost.82 
Property rights promote efficiency because they concentrate in an 
owners hands all of the costs and benefits associated with a 
particular activity; as a result, the owners self-interest calculus fully 
internalizes the social costs of his doing, thereby defeating 
 
 81 See generally Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of 
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985) (discussing rules that combine compensation for harm 
with incentives for efficient precaution within the context of the joint production.). 
 82 See id. at 1. 
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externalities.83  Externalities, the detriments imposed, or benefits 
bestowed, by a person on third parties cause inefficiency because 
they distort prices and incentives.84  For example, the failure of a 
profit-maximizing steel mill to account for the cost of pollution leads 
it to expand output beyond the point where the social marginal cost 
of its activity equals its social marginal revenue.  The pollution 
externality results in too little fresh air for the taste of everybody 
else, and overall utility or value is not maximized. 
Externalities are not only widespread, they also are bi-
directional and they do not depend on a concept of causation.85  
Confronted with two competing activities, an economist does not 
seek to determine which one causes damage to the other, but rather 
to what extent these two activities are incompatible.  For example, an 
economist does not argue that steel producerrather than nature 
loversshould pay for environmental clean up because they cause 
pollution.  Our hypothetical observer would merely comment that it 
is cheaper to prevent the emission of noxious gases than to clean 
them up, and that it is cheaper to collect clean-up costs from a few 
steel mills than from everybody else. 
The presence of externalities does not tell us anything about how 
this failure of the price system should be addressed.  Rather 
economic analysts of the law strive to find rules that reconcile 
competing activities most efficiently.  More specifically, an efficient 
 
 83 Readers of Economics will be familiar with various expressions of this idea.  See 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF  LAW, 36-37 (5th ed. 1998); Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (discussing the 
tragedy of the commons).  Every person having access to a common resource has interest 
in using it to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue from use.  Yet, if every 
person does so while ignoring other peoples calculations, the resource will be overused and 
perhaps destroyed.  The solution to the tragedy of the commons consists of attributing a 
right of property to a single person who thereafter has an incentive to match the resources 
costs and benefits.  For an application of this principle to the field of intellectual property, 
see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977). 
 84 See Demsetz, supra note 24, at 347-48; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICRO-
ECONOMICS 179-82 (1993) (explaining that externalities distort the demand or supply for 
goods and services). 
 85 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 12-13 (1960) 
(explaining that resources find their most efficient use in a free market, irrespective of initial 
ownership, provided that there are no transaction costs). 
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law creates incentives for both polluters and polluted to use 
precautions up to the point where the cost of precautions equals the 
injury suffered.86  Stated otherwise, the efficient production of a 
clean environment is a case of joint-production: it depends not only 
on the activities of polluters, but also on the precautions of the 
polluted.  Robert Cooter gave these conditions of efficiency the 
elegant name of double responsibility at the margin.87 
Not every legal rule, of course, is designed to enhance efficiency: 
some legal rules were no doubt adopted to promote equity, i.e., to 
effect a particular distribution of social costs rather than to limit their 
overall level.  A consideration of the distributive effect of the right of 
publicity is contained in Part IV. 
B. The Market for Celebrity Identity 
Without much exaggeration, consumers are solicited every minute 
of every day to buy more products and services than they could ever 
use.  On the Internet, for example, there is already far more 
information available than consumers could ever use or enjoy.  In 
these plentiful markets, it is useful to understand that firms really 
compete for the scarcest of all resources, human attention.88  
Successful companies are those that command eyeballs both because 
 
 86 See generally id. (For example, the law might not grant a remedy in nuisance to the 
person who built her cottage in the middle of an industrial park.) 
 87 See Cooter, supra note 81, at 4. 
 88 Esther Dyson, now ICANN interim chairperson, seems to have coined the expression 
market for attention.  In her view, the true measure of a firms ability to turn a profit is not 
its tangible, or even intellectual property, assets because these depreciate too fast in fickle 
consumer markets.  The key to a firms success, Dyson argues, is its sustained ability to 
draw and keep consumer attention.  See ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.1: A DESIGN FOR LIVING 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 172-201 (1998); Daniel H. Pink, Release 2.0: A Design for Living in the 
Digital Age (Book Review), 29 WASH. MONTHLY 54, (Dec. 1997); Eben Moglen, The 
Invisible Barbecue, 97 COLUMB. L. REV. 945, 952-53 (1997) (using the terms market for 
eyeballs).  This business model also extends beyond the digital world.  Consider, for 
example, the sales of Nike, the sporting goods marketer, have dropped significantly after the 
(first) retirement from the NBA of its main spokesman, super-athlete Michael Jordan.  
Jordan had been at the core of a hugely successful marketing campaign which had drawn a 
wide range of consumers to Nike because of Jordans on and off the court style.  See Charlie 
Gillis, Nike Runs into Trouble Post-Jordan as Stock Falls, NATL POST, Feb. 9, 2000. 
FINAL.DEGRAND 1/18/02  12:12 PM 
94 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.    [Vol.12:73 
 
they continue to derive much of their revenues from advertising89 
and because the ability to draw attention allows these businesses to 
enter into a growing number of product or service lines, thereby 
maximizing the top-of-mind awareness that they enjoy among 
consumers.90 
In the market for eyeballs, people who have the ability to deliver 
public attention are in high demand.91  In this respect, a marketer can 
 
 89 That traffic is crucial to the digital medium explains the emergence of sites offering 
sweepstakes and prizes to draw visitors.  See Austin Bunn, Starved for Attention, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb.13, 2000, § 6, at 20 (citing Iwon.com and freelotto.com) (Internet sites last 
visited Dec. 18, 2001).  See also Catherine Greenman, Enjoy Your New Software, and Check 
Out the Advertisements, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at G7 (discussing the trend towards 
ad-supported software).  The dependence of website publishers on advertising explains the 
considerable efforts made by firms to gather information about web users, both on and 
offline.  See Bob Tedeschi, Doubleclicks Competitors Breathe a Sigh of Relief as an 
Uproar over Privacy Abates, at Least for the Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at C10 
([A]dvertisers have watched click through rates  the average percentage of Web surfers 
who click on any single banner ad  fall below the 1 percent mark, compared with about 2 
percent in 1998.  In view of that drop, advertisers have become less willing to pay high 
advertising rates for banners, forcing Web site publishers to scramble for other sources of 
revenue.).  The recent dot.com meltdown has not yet affected online businesses 
dependence on advertising revenues even if overall online advertising spending did not 
grow in 2001 and more websites developed subscriber-based business models. 
 90 Witness Amazon.coms strategy of entering new product lines at record breaking 
speed, imitated to some extent by other merchants like Buy.com.  See Saul Hansell, 
Amazons Risky Christmas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, § 3, at 1.  This phenomenon 
testifies not only to the importance of eyeball control but also to the versatility of digital 
technology.  Because an increasing portion of a firms value added can be sold in the form 
of bit streams (sound, images, price quotes or consumer information, etc.), it is 
comparatively easier for Internet businesses to leverage their brand name from one line of 
business to another.  For a different application of this proposition, see Eben Moglen, 
Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 FIRST MONDAY 8 
(Aug. 1999), at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2001) (discussing the ubiquity of bits in the digital medium). 
 91 See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, When Dot-Coms Want to Build up Their Images, They Hitch 
Their Web Sites to a Star, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at C14 (explaining that the technique 
of borrowed interest (using celebrities in advertising) is well suited to differentiate web-
site publishers and establish their credibility because celebrities lend instant 
recognizability); Austin Bunn, Starved for Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.13, 2000, § 6, at 20 
(enumerating online retailers using celebrities as spokespersons); Jennifer Gilbert, Celebrity 
Pitchpersons Build Instant Brands For Dot-coms: Bargainbid.com Taps Dangerfield, 
ADVER. AGE, Nov. 8, 1999, at 100 (On the dot-com horizon, Mr. Twitchell said, is the use 
of cartoons as spokespeople.).  Celebrity advertisement may be particularly attractive to 
young adults, a demographic segment particularly valuable to advertisers.  See, e.g., Patricia 
Winters Lauro, Big Marketers Are Betting on Austin Powers to Endear Them to Young 
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always rely on a celebritys manicured image to reach a desired 
population in ways that one-shot ads cannot.  Famous people offer 
advertisers relationships with which they can communicate with the 
purchasing public.92  And the influence of celebrities is only likely to 
grow in coming years as entertainment markets become more global 
and a select number of international stars earn ever-larger revenues 
from their public appearances or merchandising. 
But what explains the publics interest in celebrities?  Several 
theories have been formulated to explain this phenomenon, of which 
we can retain a few promising ones.  In his provocative work Life 
The Movie, Neal Gabler argues that entertainment, and the movies in 
particular, have become so important in our individual existence that 
American public life itself has evolved to resemble the movies.93 
Gabler argues that this trend has reshaped every sphere of human 
activity from politics to religion to the arts, all because of the need 
for these activities to rival readily available entertainment in keeping 
public attention.  Not only have moving pictures become the central 
metaphor for understanding American public life, they have changed 
our epistemology, the very understanding of the world in which we 
live.  According to Gabler, we now live in the lifies.94  This lifies 
metaphor not only captures the reality that Americans use a 
significant portion of their income to be entertained; it conveys the 
idea that we have populated our lives with celebrities, those lead 
actors whose stories we eagerly watch and weave into our lives.95 
 
People, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1999, at C17.  Of course, niche marketing is not new: see, 
e.g., GAMSON, supra note 64, at 42-43. 
 92 See ADAM MORGAN, EATING THE BIG FISH: HOW CHALLENGER BRANDS CAN 
COMPETE AGAINST BRAND LEADERS 106 (1999) (At its most basic, if 70% of human 
communication is nonverbal, it is reasonable to look for the expression of ones identity to 
be manifested in some kind of visual form.  Phil Knight of Nike has remarked of the Air 
Jordan Jump Man icon, which came almost to embody the brands attitude in the 1980s, 
that it saved a lot of time  you couldnt explain much in 60 seconds, but if you showed 
Michael Jordan, you didnt need to.). 
 93 See NEAL GABLER, LIFE THE MOVIE: HOW ENTERTAINMENT CONQUERED REALITY 
(1998). 
 94 See Gabler, supra note 78, at 5. 
 95 See also RICHARD SCHICKEL, INTIMATE STRANGERS: THE CULTURE OF CELEBRITY 
(1985). 
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Our urge to know and associate with celebrities is not only 
motivated by our desire to be entertained, however.  As one author 
notes, celebrities have become, in recent decades, the chief agents 
of moral change in the United States.96  They have come to embody 
abstract issues or points of view, and are shorthand forms for ideals 
or expertise.97  Theorists have also argued that celebrities attract us 
because we see them as individuals who stand out in our anonymous, 
mass society.98  We seek them because they make us feel in-the-
know or on the inside; in our mass society, they humanize our 
lives.99  Stars attract us because they seem to be free, on-the-go 
and liberated from the constraints of daily life.100 
Not surprisingly, Gabler, like others,101 has argued that the identity 
of modern Americans is shaped not only by their intimate 
relationships, but also by their only-superficially intimate ones with 
well known personalities.102  As Kenneth Gergen writes, [w]e may 
 
 96 See id. at 39.  See also Paul Richter, Pentagon Reaches for Stars to Recruit Defense: 
U.S. Tries to Enlist Celebrities in Campaign To Attract Young People, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 
2000, at A11 (describing the Pentagons attempt to enlist celebrities to convey information 
about military opportunities to young people). 
 97 See LEO BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN: FAME AND ITS HISTORY 600-01 (Vintage 
Books 1997) (1986) (Complex phenomena wear the reduced features of emblematic 
individuals); MORGAN, supra note 92, at 119 (The single, photographed act of Princess 
Diana shaking hands with an AIDS patient at the Middlesex hospital in London did more to 
change the British publics perception on AIDS, how it was transmitted, and their 
relationship with those who had contracted the disease than years of public information, 
editorial, and advertising.). 
 98 See Gabler, supra note 78, at 7. 
 99 See  SCHICKEL, supra note 95, at 13, 250 (discussing the power of television to make 
us feel intimate with celebrities, and discussing the myth that all celebrities know one 
another, and are part of an apparently cohesive community); and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, 
Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 47 (1997) (arguing that celebrities provide us with role models). 
 100 See SCHICKEL, supra note 95, at 244-51. 
 101 See GERGEN, infra note 103, at 56-57, 71-72; and generally SCHICKEL, supra note 95. 
 102 See John Belton, Introduction, in MOVIES AND MASS CULTURE 1, 3 (John Belton ed., 
1996) (pointing out that we tend to deny that our identities are shaped by our alienated 
relationship with mass culture).  About the illusion of intimacy with celebrities, see also 
GAMSON, supra note 64, at 172-85 (arguing that our relationship with celebrities is made of 
a curious mix of fact and fiction in which we revel).  The effect of celebrities on individual 
identity is complex but perhaps most extensive and transparent in the case of children.  This 
reality certainly explains in part why advertisers target celebrity marketing at children.  For 
a brief but instructive account of this market, see Consumers Union, Selling Americas Kids: 
Commercial Pressures on Kids of the 90s, available at http://www.consumersunion.org 
/other/sellingkids/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2001). 
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know more about Merv, Oprah, Johnny and Phil than we do our 
neighbors.103 Consider, for example, the outpouring of sympathy 
and the personal grief suffered by so many on the death of Princess 
Diana,104 or in Canada, a few years ago, on the death of newscaster 
Barbara Frum.105  As far as movie stars are concerned: 
It is undoubtedly true that for many people film 
relationships provide the most emotionally wrenching 
experience of the average week.  The ultimate question is 
not whether media relationships approximate the normal 
in their significance, but whether normal relationships can 
match the power of artifice.106 
As a result, celebrities have become a sort of social glue, 
allowing people from different points of society to converse, to share 
feelings and essentially to carry on informal relations.107  In this 
view, then, the demand for celebrity images and information is 
driven in large part by societys communication needs and by our 
respective need to forge a personal identity.108 
 
 103 See KENNETH J. GERGEN, THE SATURATED SELF: DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN 
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 56 (1991) (referring to talk show hosts).  Gergen also discusses the 
cases of individuals who confuse relationships with celebrities with intimate ones.  Thus, 
David Letterman apparently sought to enjoin a woman from claiming that she was his wife.  
See also SCHICKEL, supra note 95, at 1-3 (discussing John W. Hinckley, Jr.s letters to 
actress Jodie Foster about murdering President Reagan). 
 104 This example is from GABLER, supra note 78, at 7. 
 105 The parallel with Walter Cronkite, the most trusted man in America, was striking.  
See, e.g., SCHICKEL, supra note 95, at 14-15.  According to Schickel, celebrities succeed in 
giving the impression of intimacy with us by sharing their lives and sentiments with the 
public on television shows.  Consider, for example, how late-night shows seem to have 
become a mandatory stop for American politicians. 
 106 See GERGEN, supra note 103, at 57.  See also GAMSON, supra note 64, at 129-41, 192 
(describing celebrity watchers as both cynical and believing). 
 107 See GERGEN, supra note 103, at 56, (citing Cynthia Heimel, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 2, 
1990); BRAUDY, supra note 97, at 4, 601 (The fame of others, their distinguishing marks, 
becomes a common coin of human exchange  code words more forceful (and easier to 
express) than mutual political or religious beliefs for establishing intimacy.  Talk of fame 
and its gradation is one of the few conversations that joins rather than separates us.). 
 108 See Shay Sayre, T-Shirt Messages: Fortune or Folly for Advertisers, in ADVERTISING 
AND POPULAR CULTURE: STUDIES IN VARIETY AND VERSATILITY 73, 77-82 (Sammy R. 
Danna ed., 1990), citing ROBERT A. WICKLUND, SYMBOLIC SELF-COMPLETION (1982) and 
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Explaining how fame arises, or is produced, is as difficult as 
describing the factors affecting the demand for celebrity.  In many 
ways, celebrity seems to be as unpredictable and fortuitous as life 
itself.  Moreover, becoming famous is hardly a solitary endeavor; it 
always requires a public and its acclaim.  Hence, theorists often 
emphasize the importance of the media and the public in the 
collaborative making of celebrities.109  By contrast with tangible 
goods, and to a much greater extent than other intangible goods such 
as artistic and literary works and inventions, fame is hardly the sole 
realization of its apparent subject.110  As the Sixth Circuit observed: 
[f]ame often is fortuitous and fleeting.  It always depends on the 
participation of the public in the creation of an image.  It usually 
depends on the communication of information about the famous 
person by the media.111 
 
Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of the Structure and 
Movement of the Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods, 13 J. OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 71-
84 (1986) (discussing a survey of college students on their motivation for wearing 
message t-shirts which found that students use t-shirts to communicate symbolically with 
one another.).  As the author noted at 82, however, the meanings associated with particular 
images are constantly fluctuating. 
 109 A number of authors go so far as to describe a certain brand of celebrities as the 
lesser element in this production mix.  See GABLER, supra note 78, at 160-68 (discussing the 
case of Zsa Zsa Gabor); and GAMSON supra note 64, at 1-12, 57-125.  Gamson presents the 
interesting case of Angelyne, a local Hollywood celebrity who appears to have no claim to 
fame except to have posed in a sufficient number of tourist pictures to have become a 
Hollywood fixture.  Angelyne, a Marilyn Monroe type, has been featured in magazine 
articles, television shows and advertisement billboards, and has starred in commercials.  
There is little doubt that the media contribute extensively to modern day celebrity.  MTVs 
CEO Tom Freston has stated that MTVs success can be explained in substantial part by 
consumer research: We are probably the preeminent researcher of kids, teens and young 
adults. See Sally Beatty & Carol Hymowitz, How MTV Stays Tuned In to Teens, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 21, 2000, at B1.  It is not clear, however, how broadly applied this model is.  See 
contra GAMSON, supra note 64 at 115-20 (stating that most media organizations know little 
about their public). 
 110 By looking at a number of reputational histories, Michael Madow has convincingly 
argued that media play a key role in creating disparities in fame among successful artists, 
athletes and business people.  See Madow, supra note 12, at 184-92 (1993) (discussing the 
surprising case of Einsteins celebrity).  It could be objected that this analysis is 
indiscriminate: economic value is always created by social interaction.  In the final analysis, 
the value of any good results from relationships, if only in the marketplace.  The difference 
between identity and tangible goods is one of degree, but of meaningful degree.  Fame is 
exclusively dependent on what most often are fickle and capricious tastes. 
 111 Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).  
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Unsupervised public uses of a persons identity often contribute 
significantly to a celebritys reputation or fame.  For example, actress 
Sarah Michelle Gellar, a.k.a. Buffy The Vampire Slayer, would not 
have the notoriety she has today without the deluge of fan fiction that 
features her television character.112  Moreover, it is doubtful that 
Buffys fan fiction could have been orchestrated to the same effect; 
creating buzz for oneself most often implies letting go and 
allowing a large measure of public freedom.113 
In some cases, third parties seem almost solely responsible for the 
commercial value of a persons identity.  In 1960, Cuban 
photographer Alberto Korda snapped a photo of revolutionary leader 
Che Guevara at the funeral of guerillas who had died in the explosion 
of a Belgian freighter.  The photographer took the picture by 
happenstance, capturing Guevara wearing a starred-beret as he gazed 
for a moment into the distance.  Korda offered the photo to news 
media but they declined to buy it.  So the picture hung on a wall in 
his office for seven years, until an Italian editor saw it after 
Guevaras death and immediately purchased it.  The photo was first 
published in 1967 and has since become one of the most broadly 
diffused images of all times, plastered to support social causes and 
personal revolts of all types.114 
Che Guevaras case is instructive because Ches fame has 
continued to grow since his death, obviously without promotional 
efforts on his part.115  Guevaras case also illustrates the inherently 
 
Factors has been legislatively overruled on the issue of the descendibility of the right of 
publicity: TENN. CODE  ANN. § 47-25-1104 (1995). 
 112 See http://www.fanfiction.net (last visited Sept. 30, 2001), cited in Ann Powers, Fans 
Go Interactive, and Popular Culture Feels the Tremors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2000, § H, at 
25. 
 113 But see Craig Smith, Wymans Remarks Annoy Hawks, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 
1993, at C1 (mentioning linebacker Brian Bosworths own release of No-Boz t-shirts to 
fan his fame). 
 114 See Pascal Fletcher, Vodka and Che Guevara Just Dont Mix, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(LONDON), Sept. 11, 2000, at 11 (Since then, it has adorned T-shirts, wallposters, banners 
and even wristwatch faces around the world.). 
 115 See David Sapsted, Che Guevara Sullied by Vodka Advert, Claims Photographer, 
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Aug. 8, 2000, at 7 (Henry Butterfield Ryan, a former 
United States diplomat and author of The Fall of Che Guevara, said the picture, which he 
described as one of the great photographic images of all time, is the primary reason for 
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cumulative process by which one gains social currency: not only 
might Che not have chosen to associate himself with everything he 
has been made to endorse since his death, he simply would not have 
been able to actively promote so many causes and products.  Rather, 
celebrity differs from tangible commodities to the extent that an 
exclusive right holder probably cannot maximize its value. 
But the public also tires of celebrities; many become stale, the 
buzz surrounding them giving way to fatigue and even contempt.  
For this reason, becoming and remaining a celebrity requires careful 
management, for it depends on constantly evoking the right 
impressions and remaining in the publics unaided memory.  For a 
celebrity agent or managing company this means ensuring that its 
clients give the right interviews, embrace the right type of causes and 
go to the right kinds of events.  It may extend to creating fan clubs 
and ensuring that a celebrity meets the right type of people and 
accepts the right types of endorsements.116 
Fame, therefore, presents a case of joint-production: its production 
depends on the collaboration of celebrities, publicists, the media, the 
public, and creators like Korda who recode celebrities.117  Of 
course, producing fame, like any other good, may be achieved with 
different combinations of factors of production.  Fame may arise as 
the near-exclusive result of a persons activities, with minimal public 
or media input.  For example, a runner who breaks an Olympic 
record becomes an instant celebrity without much media 
promotion.118  Other celebrities may become so only as a result of 
 
Che Guevaras legendary status.). 
 116 See, e.g., GAMSON, supra note 64, at 82-83 (describing potential conflicts between a 
sponsoring organization, a studio or record label, for example, and a celebrity: for those 
pursuing bankability based primarily on personality rather than ability, being linked to 
specific projects and roles carries an even more fundamental risk.); and Michele Willens, 
When Celebrity Hearts Bleed, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2000, §9, at 1 (News coverage is 
increasingly fixated on celebrities, so causes recruit famous spokesmen, who in turn reap the 
benefit of coverage that is more flattering than usual). 
 117 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of joint-
production). 
 118 This would also be the case of a person who becomes famous as a war hero, or for 
winning the lottery.  Of course, we almost always depend on the media to learn about events 
that we do not witness ourselves.  Nonetheless, there is distinction, if only of degree, 
between people that become famous because of the medias promotional efforts and those 
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relentless advertisement and media promotion, without there being 
any great reason as to why that person became a celebrity.119  
Finally, other people rise to fame without slick promotion and media 
assistance, but through word-of-mouth, or a certain underground 
network. 
Of course, these distinctions are only ones of degree.  Nonetheless, 
there is no doubt that celebrity presents a case of joint-production 
among a person, the media, the public and recoders.  And although 
fame can be achieved with different proportions of each factor of 
production, the inputs of the public and of recoders often 
contribute significantly to this production mix. 
C. The Economic Case for the Right of Publicity 
In light of the foregoing, how does the right of publicity promote 
efficiency in the market for celebrity?  Judges and academics have 
argued that the right of publicity does so by offering additional 
incentives for potential celebrities to invest in skills that could make 
them famous and increase the value of their persona.120  Indeed, at 
the margin, increasing such rewards would result in additional 
investments in celebrity-making by an increasing number of 
individuals.  Without a right of publicity, ongoing renown might 
never be achieved in the first place.121 
There are difficulties with this theory, however.  As a preliminary 
matter, the right of publicity rewards far more than exemplary 
 
whose fame is more immediate (or less mediated). 
 119 See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: THE GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 45-
76 (1961) (describing celebrities as persons who are well known for being well known). 
 120 Applied to celebrities themselves, the argument goes that too few skills will be 
developed unless the law internalizes into all potential celebrities private decision-making, 
a private benefit equal to the benefit that they convey on all of us.  See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 
U.S. at 573; Mathews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d at 437-38; Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 441 (Bird, J., 
dissenting).  In this view, awarding Michael Jordan the exclusive right to market his persona 
increases the revenues he may expect to earn if he is successful, thereby creating additional 
incentives for him to become famous, presumably by training hard. 
 121 In this view, public identity resembles other intellectual properties, like artistic and 
literary works and inventions.  See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
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achievement; it offers no incentives to those who become famous 
accidentally, such as lottery winners.122  Even without invoking such 
an extreme case, the importance of skills or talent in the making of 
celebrity should not be overstated.  Fame rewards pure talent only 
unreliably and, as the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON UNFAIR 
COMPETITION points out: [i]n other cases the commercial value 
acquired by a persons identity is largely fortuitous or otherwise 
unrelated to any investment made by the individual, thus diminishing 
the weight of the property and unjust enrichment rationales for 
protection.123 
Moreover, one might wonder whether the right of publicity is an 
effective way to sponsor fame.  Marginal analysis tells us nothing 
about how much the right of publicity contributes to the overall 
supply of celebrity: this issue rather depends on the supply function 
of celebrities, their income elasticity and the level of economic rent 
they enjoy.  Consider, for example, that the vast majority of right of 
publicity plaintiffs come from fields of endeavor that already offer 
substantial rewards to their stars; these plaintiffs would surely still 
make a living without the right of publicity.124  In any case, the 
elusive character of fame probably makes it difficult for an aspiring 
celebrity to assess rationally the marginal value of additional 
preparation.  This is the case for two reasons: in fields where talent 
or skills contribute to success to a more limited degreein the arts or 
in show business, for example, where the definition of excellence 
depends on public taste and is therefore more elusiveassessing the 
marginal return of additional training is simply impossible.  And in 
fields where skills and talents are clearly tributary of famesuch as 
sports, where there are objective criteria of successthe market 
structure will often make it nearly impossible for a contestant to 
assess rationally the marginal revenue of an additional hour of 
training.125 
 
 122 See PINCKAERS, supra note 22, at 249. 
 123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c. 
 124 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 4-3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c. (1995); and Grady, supra note 22, at 111. 
 125 See ROBERT H. FRANK AND PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL-SOCIETY 3, 24-
26 (1995) (describing winner-take-all markets where even small differences in 
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To put the matter more incisively, fame pre-existed the right of 
publicity and no one apparently needed the laws protection to 
become famous before this century.  This fact suggests either that the 
cost of developing a well known identity is slight or that there are 
incentives to do so independent of the right of publicity.126  Indeed, 
we would still have celebrities without the right of publicity, and 
their quality would not be lower.127 
A better argument in favor of the right of publicity is that it offers 
incentives for celebrities and their promoters to prevent the over-
exploitation of certain personae.  Indeed, although it may not at first 
appear to be the case, the identity of celebrities may be over-
exploited.128  As Mark Grady rightly pointed out by considering the 
case of Waits v. Frito-Lay,129 individual consumption of celebrity 
goods and services often creates negative externalities.  In Waits, a 
potato chip manufacturer had sponsored TV commercials that 
featured music sung in a pop singers distinctive style, without 
compensating him.  The Ninth Circuit found against the defendant 
and ordered the payment of damages.  Why?  Mark Grady explains 
that the confectionary companys use of a Waits sound-alike voice 
ignored the social cost of its behavior, namely that it tired the public 
of his gravely voice and associated Waits voice with potato chips.130  
 
performance result in enormous differences in income). 
 126 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30  J.L. & ECON. 265, 273 (1987) (making this argument about trademarks). 
 127 It would be entirely speculative to conclude that the right of publicity has increased 
the quality of fame from which our society benefits.  In fact, conservative authors have aired 
the opposite, if equally speculative, view that the rise of the right of publicity has been 
paralleled by a cheapening of American culture.  See, e.g., JAMES B. TWITCHELL, CARNIVAL 
CULTURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA (1992). 
 128 This proposition may be surprising because celebrity has (some of) the attributes of a 
public good.  Public goods, like fresh air or national defense, share the characteristics that 
their consumption is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.  Consumption of a good is 
nonrivalrous if it costs nothing for an additional person to consume it.  Consumption is non 
excludable if it costs a lot to exclude any individual from enjoying it once one individual 
already consumes it.  See STIGLITZ, supra note 84, at 180-82. 
 129 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d. 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
1080 (1993); and Grady, supra note 22, at 101. 
 130 Like all other goods, the plaintiffs voice had a decreasing marginal value in use and 
Frito-Lays use diminished public fondness for it.  There might even have come a point at 
which people would have been willing to pay not to hear Waits voice again.  For Grady, the 
problem is compounded by the fact that most unauthorized uses of human persona are 
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By ordering the payment of damages, the Court simply forced Frito-
Lay to bear the social cost of its actions. 
Thus, creating a property right in human identity internalizes in a 
single persons decision-making process all relevant costs and 
benefits, and allows her to choose the optimal level and mix of uses 
for her identity.  In this view, the right of publicity is more necessary 
than ever because the ubiquity of images in our society has only 
accentuated the problem of negative externalities that arise in the 
consumption of celebrity goods and services.131 
This account of the right of publicity is incomplete, however, 
because not all uses of human identity tire the public.132  Indeed, 
individual consumption of celebrity identity not only results in 
negative externalities, but often also leads to positive network 
effects.133  Why?  Many uses of celebrity identity are faddish and, at 
certain points along the demand curve for celebrity goods and 
services, individual consumptions are not rivalrous, but 
complementary.134  There are two explanations for this phenomenon.  
In some cases, there may be a bandwagon effect, in which early 
consumption of goods by some people modifies the tastes of 
others.135  A common example of this phenomenon is when some 
 
lesser uses that cheapen the value of a persons identity.  See Grady, supra note 22, at 
103-04.  For other expressions of the congestion externality reasoning, see PINCKAERS, 
supra note 22, at 246; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 2-14; POSNER, supra note 22, at 
49; Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962); Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prod., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (Cal. 1979); and Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 
437-38 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 131 This reality may also explain the emergence of the right of publicity in this century; 
see supra note 24 and accompanying text.  See also Grady, supra note 22, at 105. 
 132 There are some obvious limits to the congestion externalities argument; otherwise, 
the Bible or the Odyssey would hold little interest today. 
 133 Stated differently, celebrity identity has some of the attributes of public goods.  On 
network effects, see generally S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and 
Externalities, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671-75 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 134 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 12, at 221-22. 
 135 See Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen Effects in the Theory of 
Consumer Demand, Q. J. OF ECON. 183  (1950); and Jeff Biddle, A Bandwagon Effect in 
Personalized Licence Plates?, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 375 (1991) (presenting evidence of a 
bandwagon effect in vanity licence plates). 
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people modify their preferences to conform to others.136  To illustrate 
the matter, my blaring Tom Waits music from my car may not 
diminish the value that others derive from listening to him; in fact, 
they may enjoy Waits music even more because I make it 
fashionable. 
Another reason why not all uses of celebrity identity are rivalrous 
is that consumption and learning may take place simultaneously.137  
My enjoyment of Tom Waits musical genre may depend on being 
exposed to his voice through other peoples consumption: his music 
may be an acquired taste.138  Similarly, a person seeing my Air 
Jordan shoes may try to find out more about Michael Jordan, 
particularly if I seem to enjoy being associated with him through my 
footwear.  These phenomena may be especially significant in 
markets where goods advertise a celebritythe t-shirt market for 
exampleor for celebrities whose fans mimic their dress or 
distinctive features. 
It is for similar reasons that informative uses of celebrity identity 
are not generally thought to be damaging.  To be sure, unauthorized 
biographies, entertainment magazines, even the news, cause 
congestion externalities by adding to a celebritys exposure.  Yet, the 
informative character of these uses creates net positive externalities 
because, whether authorized or not, these uses enrich the social 
meaning of celebrities.  And although unauthorized biographies, for 
example, may interfere with a celebritys management of her 
persona, such uses of identity usually also delay the moment when 
the public tires of a particular celebrity.  Thus, consumption of 
celebrity identity not only imposes social costs in the form of 
 
 136 See Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of 
Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITER. 75, 78-81 (1998) (referring to 
conformism). 
 137 See generally G. Stigler and G. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 
AMER. ECON. REV. 76 (1977); and EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th 
ed. 1995) (describing the contemporary understanding of how innovation spreads). 
 138 There is evidence that the demand for music recordings changed after the appearance 
of the walkman.  This shift in demand has been explained in part by the fact that, from then 
on, a considerable fraction of consumption was private rather than public.  See, e.g., Sagi 
Douglas, Decades Come a Long Way, Baby: Home Tech in the 80s, VANCOUVER SUN, 
Dec. 16, 1989, at D1. 
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negative externalities; it also results in social benefits in the form of 
network effects. 
This discussion of network effects ties in directly with what was 
stated earlier about the demand for celebrity identity being driven by 
consumers identity and expressive needs.  As noted earlier, 
celebrities contribute significantly to peoples self-awareness.  As a 
result, they acquire a secondary meaning and become shorthand 
expressions for timely views, events or ideals.139  In fact, the 
modern-day ubiquity of celebrities and our desire to be entertained 
nearly guarantee that the public will begin using them as figures of 
speech to express everything from the trivial to the sublime, all with 
ensuing implications for human identity.  Celebrities enhance our 
discourse and allow our mass society to reach mass understanding.  
But the value of a language is proportional to the number of people 
who speak and understand it; this is the main source of positive 
externalities that arise in the consumption of celebrity identity.140  
What makes celebrities likeness valuable, and what is at risk of 
over-exploitation, therefore, is not their traits, names or voices per 
se; it is the meaning associated with their persona, their power to 
evoke positive ideas and feelings from an audience. 
Moreover, there are costs associated with the right of publicity 
because enforcing such a right makes it more expensive, in absolute 
terms, for up-and-coming public figures to draw on already 
appropriated styles or features.141  The right of publicity also chills 
commercial, expressive uses of already famous people.  In this light, 
a  central  challenge  of  the  right  of  publicity  consists in balancing  
 
 139 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  For an interesting legal treatment of 
these issues, see generally Kwall, supra note 99. 
 140 For a brief look at the economics of language, see Landes & Posner, supra note 126, 
at 271-73. 
 141 I say in absolute terms because some of this genre-recycling is clearly allowed 
under the current law: see Hughes, supra note 10, at 947.  On the other hand, certain right of 
publicity cases  Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982), 
for example  have been criticized for privatizing a genre that had originally sustained 
more than a single performer. 
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rights in personal identity with the necessity of allowing everyone to 
dip into a rich common cultural pool.142 
These last two propositionsthat consumption of identity results 
in network effects and that the right of publicity makes certain forms 
of expression more costlyexplain in economic terms the idea 
voiced by many others that the current right of publicity is overbroad 
because it prevents socially valuable recoding.143  These authors 
have argued that the right of publicity is overbroad because it 
prevents a whole range of transformative uses of cultural symbols 
that are most important to subculturesracial, ethnic or sexual 
minoritieswhose identities are not adequately reflected in 
mainstream media.144  The recoding critique of the right of publicity 
makes perfect economic sense because popular figures, like popular 
copyrighted characters145 or popular trademarks,146 do acquire a 
secondary meaning and enter the public discourse.  It is also 
unquestionable that todays stars draw some of their appeal from 
cultural references that once belonged to others.147  Moreover, the 
 
 142 This argument has often been aired with respect to copyright. See, e.g., BENJAMIN 
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2, 78 (1967); and William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 347-
49 (1989). 
 143 See generally Aoki, supra note 10; Madow, supra note 12; Haemmerli, supra note 
13; and Hughes, supra note 10.  However, most academic commentary about recoding has 
been made in the context of copyright.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text (defining 
recoding). 
 144 See, e.g., RICHARD DYER, HEAVENLY BODIES: FILM STARS AND SOCIETY 141-94 
(1986) (discussing Judy Garland and the gay community). 
 145 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. Amer. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(It is decidedly in the interests of creativity, not piracy, to permit authors to take 
well-known phrases and fragments from copyrighted works and add their own contributions 
of commentary or humor.); and MORGAN, supra note 92, at 58 (The Energizer Bunny, 
equally, has become a part of the popular culture.). 
 146 Genericized marks are broadly recoded marks.  This is the case of  thermos and 
escalator, among others.  Some trademarks which have not yet been found by courts to be 
generic are also the object of common recoding: Xerox, the Marlboro Man (see, e.g., 
MARTIN P. LEVINE, GAY MACHO: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE HOMOSEXUAL CLONE 
(1998)), Rolls Royce.  That their owners think it is necessary to launch advertising 
campaigns to educate the public about their proper use is convincing evidence of ongoing 
threatening recoding.  See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION: CASES AND MATERIALS 349-60 (2d ed. 1996). 
 147 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 947 (Madonna, Prince, and Elvis Costello have drawn 
from Marilyn Monroe, Jimi Hendrix, and Buddy Holly, respectively.). 
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recoding critique also makes sense from an economic point of view 
because we might suspect network externalities associated with 
celebrity uses to be especially significant among communities for 
whom identity concerns are particularly acute.148 
The best economic case for the right of publicity, therefore, is that 
it offers incentives to celebrities and their managers to prevent the 
over-exploitation of social symbols: like trademarks, rights of 
publicity protect the publics recognition of figures useful for social 
communication.149  In this utilitarian view, the right of publicity, like 
a trademark, is only a bribe paid by the law to induce the private 
protection of a semiotic value.150  In fact, it is mostly public relations 
investments that would not be undertaken without the right of 
publicity.  Yet, celebrities also undoubtedly enter our public 
discourse and become figures of speech.  In that capacity, the value 
of a persons identity is proportional to the number of people who 
have access to it and use it.  Thus, efficient rules of right of publicity 
infringement should prevent the over-exploitation of celebrity 
identity while at the same time encouraging communicative uses that 
produce greater positive externalities than negative ones. 
 
 148 See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1991); Estate 
of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Steven M. Cordero, Note, 
Cocaine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity 
Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599, 633-37 
(discussing the case of Elvis Presley); Madow, supra note 12, at 144-45 and 185-88 
(discussing John Wayne cards and Albert Einstein, the personification of the genius 
scientist); Hughes, Recoding, supra note 10, at 935-36 (discussing Jeff Koonss art and 
many other examples); and DYER, supra note 144 (discussing Judy Garland and the gay 
community).  A mainstream example of transformative use of identity is the bronze statue at 
Arlington National Cemetery of the raising of the American flag over Iwo Jima in 1944.  
The bronze statue, which was shaped from a Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph, became a 
symbol of courage and the sign of Americas ascendance in international affairs.  It has been 
imitated, derided and venerated.  See MORGAN, supra note 92, at 120-21 (pointing out that 
none of the men depicted are above the rank of sergeant); and JAMES BRADLEY, FLAGS OF 
OUR FATHERS (2000). 
 149 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 49 (5th ed. 1998). 
 150 For a more detailed presentation of this view of trademarks, see Justin Hughes, 
Recoding, supra note 10, at 996-1001.  See also Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, 
Authors and Artists Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. 
LEG. STUD. 95, 105-7 (1997) (analyzing moral rights in terms of how they protect the 
publics interest). 
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D. The Optimal Right of Publicity 
1. The Problem of Transaction Costs 
Economists often point out that market mechanisms are the most 
efficient means of resource allocation because they put decision-
making powers in the hands of those who have the best information 
about the value of assets.151  If this is so, however, why bother 
defining the optimal scope of the right of publicity?  As Ronald 
Coase suggested, why not simply give everyone an absolute property 
right in her identity and let the market decide who should control 
what rights over whose identity?152  As one might suspect, the 
problem lies with transaction costs, which can be sizable and may 
not be passed on to consumers. 
From the point of view of a person seeking to use a celebritys 
persona, transaction costs include the cost of identifying the owner of 
the right; the cost of negotiating use with the owner; and the cost of 
obtaining a right to use.  Under the current law, the cost of 
identifying the owner of the right of publicity would seem 
manageable because the law grants every person power over her 
identity.  With time, however, locating right holders becomes much 
more difficult, for example in cases regarding old film footage.153  A 
related case where transaction costs may prevent efficient bargaining 
is when a commercially valuable image evokes the identity of several 
people and rights must be cleared with all of them.  In those 
circumstances, attributing strong property rights in persona may 
result   in   an   anti-commons   problem:  a  productive  intellectual  
 
 151 See Cooter, supra note 81, at 25-26. 
 152 See Coase, supra note 85. 
 153 See generally Marcia Biederman, They Right The Songs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, 
§ 14, at 4 (describing the rights clearing business, including for old footage: Our job is half 
Sherlock Holmes and half Monty Hall); and Stuart Elliott, Real or Virtual? You Call It; 
Digital Sleight of Hand Can Put Ads Almost Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at C1 
(describing the commercially interesting opportunity of placing virtual ads in old films, and 
the problem of compensating right holders for this use of their work.) 
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property resource may lie idle because multiple owners cannot agree 
on a common use.154 
The cost of negotiating use of a celebritys identity may also be 
important because of the likely uncertainty of assessing the value for 
a persons likeness.155  Ex ante, the cost associated with negotiating a 
celebrity deal is likely to be very large because a persons future 
popularity in any particular market is hard to predict.  In addition, 
high monitoring costs probably prevent celebrities from entering into 
many profit sharing schemes.  Finally, pending negotiations may 
give rise to a hold-out problem if the venture ends up being 
successful, and negotiations take place post facto. 
A related problem also giving rise to transaction cost involves the 
opportunity for moral hold out.  This was more or less explicitly the 
case in the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change case 
where Rev. Kings estate may have felt that the unauthorized use 
plastic bustscheapened the pastors image.156  Moral holdout also 
arises in cases of parody or caricature.  In a case like White, for 
 
 154 The proverbial example of this phenomenon is The Brady Bunch.  Use of footage 
from the television show has required agreement from each of the actors portraying Brady 
kids (and their parents, while the actors were still minors), the Brady parents, and the Brady 
housekeeper, Alice  as is typical of licensing agreements for such shows.).  See Michael 
A. Heller, The Tragedy of The Anticommons: Property in The Transition From Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 679, n.259 (1998).  See also Marcia Biederman, They 
Right The Songs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1999, § 14, at 4 (giving the example of Elvis Presley 
on the Ed Sullivan Show and reporting a rights clearance expert as saying The reason I 
have a business is this is so complicated). 
 155 The fact that celebrities rely on agents to negotiate and authorize public uses of their 
likeness suggests that negotiation costs are positive and that celebrities carefully pick the 
type of events or products with which they want to associate.  In addition, behavioral 
science would suggest that identity transaction costs are high because psychological 
biases complicate the task of appraising the value of a celebritys identity.  Indeed, it is 
likely that celebrities systematically overvalue the commercial worth of their likeness 
because of an important endowment effect.  What appears more naturally ones own than 
identity?  Yet, having an identity is not determinative of the price one can obtain in a market 
for personality-rich goods and services.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral 
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184-85 (1997); and Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1483-85 (1998). 
 156 Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 
694 F.2d 674, 683 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that the King family considered the use 
unflattering and unfitting.). 
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example, it is unlikely that a proud or vain plaintiff would have 
consented to Samsungs use, nor would the joke have been the same 
had she consented.157  Given that many people may be interested in 
using an omnipresent celebritys likeness, the latter may simply 
decide not to consent to whole ranges of uses. 
Finally, it is also costly to obtain a license to use a celebritys 
likeness: if a persons public appeal can easily be tainted by negative 
associations, she will try to exercise as much control as possible over 
the circumstances of her appearance.158  In turn, these demands 
imply non-negligible monitoring costs.  Obtaining a nationwide 
license to use a persons likeness also imposes the cost of dealing 
with fifty different state laws that may vary considerably with respect 
to the scope of the protection they afford.159  Licensees must ponder 
the risk of litigation arising from unclear commercial use 
standards. 
On this analysis, therefore, obtaining a license to use a persons 
likeness entails non-negligible expenditures; only people who value a 
persona more than the total of these costs will succeed in negotiating 
a commercial use, even if the public values a commercial use of that 
persons likeness more than the transaction and monitoring costs.160  
Further, this situation is likely to become ever more frequent on the 
Internet where our traditional understanding of commercial use 
probably includes a whole range of self-edited and self-published 
products that are only marginally profitable.161  Moreover, potential 
licensees are often unable to pass on to consumers these additional 
transaction costs.  For example, the logic of network effects suggests 
 
 157 See supra note 31 (discussing the White Case).  After all, caricature and self-
deprecation are not equivalent. 
 158 For example, celebrities may attempt to reserve to themselves the right to approve an 
advertisements script or the time at which a TV commercial will be broadcast.  That the 
collective right of publicity management organizations seem not to have not taken off may 
testify to the control that celebrities want to keep over their identities. 
 159 For example, the scope and duration of the post mortem right of publicity vary 
significantly from state to state.  Less than half of the states have statutes on the subject 
matter and the protection afforded ranges from 100 years to nothing at all.  See generally 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9.18, at 9-44  9-45. 
 160 In particular, it may be prohibitively expensive to coordinate a negotiation for the 
benefit of everyone who is interested in a celebritys likeness. 
 161 See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952). 
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that the entrepreneur who first marketed John Wayne greeting cards 
cum lipstick to the gay community could not have charged 
consumers what it would have cost him to purchase the actors 
consent.162  And the uncertainty surrounding the profitability of any 
identity-rich venture always limits the ability of an entrepreneur to 
incur significant licensing costs up-front. 
The significance of these transaction costs, and the difficulty in 
passing them on to consumers, can hardly be underestimated.  To the 
extent that the value of a persona depends on its becoming a figure of 
speech, its value is proportional to the number of people who have 
access to, and use it as a reference point of sorts.  Yet, transaction 
costs may easily outweigh the benefit that any individual person 
derives from a celebritys identity, giving rise to a classic 
coordination problem.  In light of these factors, the law must divide 
the rights in a persons identity and allocate them to those most likely 
to maximize their value. 163 
2. The Current Commercial Use Criterion of Right of Publicity 
Infringement 
The laws current solution consists of granting every person a right 
to prevent third parties from using her identity for commercial 
purposes, including for advertising.  How efficient is this 
commercial use condition of right of publicity infringement?  All 
things considered, the laws current test is less efficient than it is 
generally assumed to be.  On the one hand, harm to a celebritys 
persona may easily be caused by non-commercial uses, public 
interest advertisements, for example.164  Privileged entertainment 
uses like photos on the cover of the National Enquirer also cheapen a 
 
 162 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 163 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 103, 125 (1979) (noting that in the presence of transaction costs and once a particular 
distribution of income is reached, the wealth-maximization principle requires the initial 
vesting of rights in those who are likely to value them the most). 
 164 Recall that these uses may be privileged: see supra note 40.  If the commercial use 
requirement prevents a third party from depreciating a celebritys identity by associating her 
with goods and services, it does not prevent a third party from depreciating it by associating 
her with ideas (subject to the law of defamation.). 
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celebritys image and tire the public of her.165  If it is true that 
amateur uses of human persona are less likely to degrade it, 
defamation actions, whether successful or not, amply show that 
people can be injured by each other and the media.166 
On the other hand, the current law fails to recognize that some 
commercial uses of a persons identity, unauthorized t-shirts, for 
example, may actually increase her fame rather than diminish it.167  
Furthermore, certain commercial uses have effects that are nearly 
identical to privileged ones.  What is the difference between a 
Howard Hughes biography and a Howard Hughes board game 
requiring players to answer questions about the reclusive 
millionaires life?168  Was the courts decision in the latter case based 
on the view that board game players are less likely to discuss the 
millionaires life than people who read a biography?  The distinction 
would be questionable.169 
 
 165 Media uses are also capable of causing moral harm: see, e.g., Tellado v. Time-Life 
Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986) (involving the unauthorized use of a 
photograph of the plaintiff while he served in Vietnam). 
 166 See also supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text, on the difficulty of applying the 
commercial use criterion to mixed uses. 
 167 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 12, at 221-22. This reasoning did not sway the 
California Supreme Court on the facts of Comedy III Prods. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 
P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).  In that case, the Court held that reproductions of the Three Stooges 
sold on t-shirts infringed the Plaintiffs right of publicity. Moreover, the Court held that the 
admittedly expressive uses of the Three Stooges likeness were not protected by the First 
Amendment because they were not so transformative as to override the Plaintiffs right of 
publicity.  Id. at 808-10.  But the California Supreme Court did observe that certain 
unauthorized uses of celebrity likeness were likely to increase a celebritys fame.  Id. at 808 
(observing that a work containing transformative elements is also less likely to interfere 
with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity) and 808 n.9 (noting in 
passing that unauthorized noncommercial uses may be more deserving of First 
Amendment protection, for example, T-shirts of a recently deceased rock musician 
produced by a fan as a not-for-profit tribute.). 
 168 Compare Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128 (Sup. Ct. 
1968), affd, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969) (involving a biography of Howard 
Hughes), with Rosemont Enters. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146-47 (Sup. Ct. 
1973), modified, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973) (involving a board game about Howard 
Hughess life). 
 169 In a society where bite-size information is increasingly common, social 
communication may also flow best in the form of anecdotes and vignettes.  The 
consequence of the publics reduced attention span must be morseled communication.  To 
consider the board game example again, have we not been caught repeating quiz-show or 
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Finally, the examples of recoding visited earlier all involve 
commercial uses; yet, a good argument could be made that some, if 
not all, of these uses had social value.170  The fact that the right of 
publicity has no doctrine whose purpose is to allow third party 
improvements171 or to allow the use of personae that have become 
generic further suggests that commercial use is not a good proxy 
for socially valueless use. 
3. Efficient Rules of Right of Publicity Infringement 
My earlier discussion of economic theory suggests that efficient 
rules of right of publicity infringement satisfy two conditions.  The 
first condition merely restates the marginal principle presented 
earlier:172 the law should curtail unauthorized public uses of human 
identity only up to the point where the social loss incurred from 
suppressing these uses, discounted for its improbability and timing, 
equals the marginal social benefit of increased protection of 
identity.173  Thus, the law of publicity should prohibit unauthorized 
uses of identity that harm itthat result in net negative 
externalitiesbut would allow unauthorized uses that result in net 
positive externalitiesinformative or recoding uses, for example. 
The second condition seeks to achieve double responsibility at the 
margin.174  Efficient rules of right of publicity infringement should 
make both the right of publicity holder and third parties take an 
 
Trivial Pursuit questions to friends?  Has a board game like Scruples never triggered 
important conversations? 
 170 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 171 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual 
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997).  Efficiency would suggest that the law should 
allow improvements (in the form of transformative uses) even if they competed with the 
celebritys use of her likeness. 
 172 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 173 This condition is an adaptation of the principle formulated by Judge Learned Hand in 
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and 
transposed to free speech issues by Chief Judge Posner.  See Richard A. Posner, Free 
Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).  For simplicitys 
sake, my analysis ignores the cost of the legal apparatus necessary to enforce the right of 
publicity. 
 174 See supra note 81and accompanying text. 
FINAL.DEGRAND 1/18/02  12:12 PM 
2001] UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET FOR CELEBRITY 115 
 
efficient level of precautions against the depreciation of the 
holders identity.  Thus, the law should proscribe a third-party use of 
a persona that diminishes its value by an amount greater than the 
value of that third partys use.  Conversely, however, a right of 
publicity plaintiff should not recover if the cost of her precautions 
is less than the value of the use she seeks to prevent.  Right of 
publicity holders should not be entitled to damages for uses that 
infringe on that part of their identity that is more valuable to others 
than it is to them.  That task, of course, is no easy feat because high 
transaction costs obscure the true market value of human personae.  
Nonetheless, efficient rules of right of publicity infringement would 
distinguish between that part of a persons identity that is most 
valuable to her, and that part of her halo, the value of which is 
maximized by third party uses.175 
An alternate way to present this argument is to point out, as was 
done before, that fame is produced and cultivated jointly by a 
celebrity, her publicists, the media, the public and recoders who 
infuse new life into it.176  Although fame may be producedin 
different contexts at leastwith different proportions of these factors 
of production, the law should strive to create incentives for all of 
these contributors to collaborate efficiently.  For example, giving 
celebrities absolute rights over their identity is unlikely to result in an 
optimal production of fame because our understanding of celebrity 
suggests that the media must be able to publicize it and the public 
must have meaningful opportunities to use it creatively, in formal 
and informal contexts. 
 
 175 This idea bares similarity to the notion that a person who becomes famous waives 
some of her right to privacy to the public. 
 176 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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Hence, celebrity marketing may resemble what Robert Merges and 
Richard Nelson have termed cumulative technologies industries, 
industries where overly broad rights will preempt too many 
competitive development efforts.177  In these cumulative 
technologies industries, the authors argue, the law should be 
concerned not only with the over-utilization of resources, but also 
with their under-utilization.178  Similarly, it could be argued that 
because popularity, like innovation, is so notoriously difficult to 
predict, the law should be careful not to give an individual so broad a 
right over her identity that it prevents third parties from lending their 
best abilities to improve on its marketing, albeit for a profit.  Once a 
celebrity acquires a secondary meaning, the only way to maximize 
its social value is to allow third parties to recode it.179  Indeed, the 
striking feature of recoding uses, which post-modern authors have 
discussed for a number of years now, is that they involve cases of 
celebrities acquiring a secondary meaning that they themselves 
would not have been in a position to develop.180 
So, what rules of right of publicity infringement result in an 
efficient production of fame?  Undoubtedly, creating some sort of 
property right in identity is an efficient solution to the problem of 
congestion externalities in consumption.  Moreover, celebrities are 
best situated to maximize the core value of their likenesses, 
particularly in choosing how to associate their traits with goods and 
services.  When celebrities acquire a secondary meaning, however, 
they become figures of speech; in this capacity, their value is 
maximized when the public and creators are allowed to use their 
identity freely.  Indeed, expressive, recoding uses, whether 
commercial or not, that do not compete with a celebritys ability to 
exploit her identity are likely to result in net positive externalities.  
This is another way of saying that the public and third-party recoders 
 
 177 See Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 875 (1990).  These authors describe cumulative 
technologies industries as those where todays advances build on and interact with many 
other features of existing technology.  See id. at 881. 
 178 See id. 
 179 Obviously there is no clear point where a celebrity acquires a secondary meaning; 
choosing one necessarily involves a certain degree of arbitrariness. 
 180 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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actively contribute to the making and upkeep of a persons fame.  
Moreover, courts should pay attention to transaction or coordination 
costs in determining whether a particular unauthorized use of a 
persona is legal.  Thus, the law should grant every person a property 
right in her identity; but if she is a celebrity and her persona has 
acquired secondary meaning, she should only recover if the 
unauthorized use of her identity is deceptive or directly competes 
with her own use, without being transformative.  In addition, the law 
should consider whether the plaintiff and defendant could have 
agreed to the allegedly infringing use if the defendant had sought 
authorization or whether transaction or coordination costs would 
have prevented that transaction. 
The rules proposed here would leave intact a large part of the law 
of publicity.  For example, unauthorized deceptive uses of persona 
would remain right of publicity infringements because these uses 
have no social value and cause significant injury to a celebrity, 
especially if she has already endorsed goods or services in related 
markets.181  Similarly, uses of persona in circumstances that are 
shocking or repulsive also result in near immediate harm, and should 
be considered deceptive.182  Unauthorized reproductions of 
performances would also remain right of publicity infringements 
because they directly compete with a performers business, while the 
social benefit of copied performances is limited if the defendant does 
not improve on the plaintiffs act.183  Finally, in all of these cases, 
transaction costs are not a significant problem. 
At the other end of the spectrum, unauthorized informative uses 
would remain privileged because they result in positive rather than 
negative externalities.184  Indeed, uses that trigger curiosity rather 
than fatigue usually do not result in congestion externalities.  
Moreover, informative uses often entail high transaction costs 
 
 181 As I see it, a use is deceptive if it inaccurately represents that a particular person has 
endorsed a good or service. 
 182 Transaction costs are usually not at issue in cases involving celebrity endorsements 
because advertisers often can internalize the whole benefit of the unauthorized use. 
 183 Because current technology can reproduce performances at a low marginal cost, an 
infringing performer probably does not fulfill a need that the plaintiff could not have 
satisfied himself. 
 184 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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because it is notoriously difficult to make consumers pay for 
information.185  On this account, cases like Rosemont Enterprises 
and Abdul Jabbar, although they involved commercial uses, may 
have been wrongly decided.186 
At least since the copyright case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
works of parody, even commercial, have been protected because a 
works commercial nature is only one element in the inquiry of its 
purpose and character and not every commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively. . . unfair. . . .187  Further, parody or satire 
often requires that its victims not consent.  Consider, for example, 
how after being derided for so long, former Vice President Dan 
Quayle agreed to be featured in a potato chip commercial, a 
reference to his difficulty spelling the word potato.188  Whether the 
move benefited the Vice Presidents image or not, we certainly 
understood his TV appearance to be self-interested.  Truth be told, 
satire and self-deprecation are not the same, and the former does not 
tolerate paid accomplices.  In addition, satire is unlikely to cause 
harm because the public probably does not believe that it originated 
with the celebrity.189  For these reasons, most satires should be 
privileged, even if they take the form of a commercial good. 
By contrast with the current law, the rules proposed here would 
privilege the majority of recoding uses cited above because although 
they might all have resulted in net positive externalities, they were 
 
 185 Indeed, we all tend to discount what we do not know.  Moreover, assessing the 
usefulness of information often depends on learning about its precise nature; but given that 
people cannot unlearn what they have just been made aware of, making people pay for 
information has always been a challenge. 
 186 See supra notes 31, 49 and accompanying texts.  In Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors 
Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit held that the Defendants use of the 
Plaintiffs real name in an advertisement was sufficient to support a right of publicity claim.  
But what economic injury had the Plaintiff suffered?  Had GMs commercial featured an 
adequate disclaimer (so as to avoid consumer deception), how would it have threatened 
Abdul-Jabbars ability to endorse goods? 
 187 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 584 (1994). 
 188 See Maureen Dowd, Selling Chips? Or Is it Quayle? Its All a Blur, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 1994, § 1, at 6. 
 189 Another type of unauthorized use which may be unlikely to cause harm is one which 
the celebrity can easily refute or disavow. 
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equally unlikely to have been negotiated.190  By way of example, 
consider the marketing to the gay community of John Wayne 
greeting cards featuring a picture of the famed actor, modified to 
make it seem like he wore lipstick.191  It is highly unlikely that either 
Wayne or his family would have consented to his becoming a 
symbolic figure in the gay community.  Even if the family had 
considered licensing the actors image for the venture, its speculative 
nature and the risk of damage to Waynes macho image would have 
given rise to insurmountable transaction costs.  The entrepreneurial 
card-maker would also have been at a loss to pass on to consumers 
the full cost of what the Wayne estate would have liked to be paid for 
this use.  Wayne stardom merely guaranteed that he would stay away 
from the card business at any affordable price. Yet, the proposed use 
was transformative, non-deceptive and apparently had some value to 
the community who recoded him. 
An important lesson to draw from the current law of publicity is 
that the commercial nature of an unauthorized use of human identity 
cannot be determinative of the issue of infringement.  After all, the 
Supreme Courts decision in Zacchini involved what was allegedly 
one of the most sacred form of speech, news reporting.  Furthermore, 
it is also telling that no clear rules have developed to address 
instances where commercial and communicative speech is 
intertwined.192  Correspondingly, the commercial/non-commercial 
dichotomy should not be the touchstone of right of publicity 
infringement. 
Expressive unauthorized commercial or advertising uses would 
often be privileged under the rules proposed, although there is much 
uncertainty concerning their legality now.  Imagine that a 
pharmaceutical company published print ads, or information 
pamphlets featuring the photos of well known individuals who 
 
 190 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 191 Madow, supra note 12, at 144-45. 
 192 See Riley v. Natl Fedn of Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 787-89 (1988) (describing 
charitable solicitations as mixed speech subject to more than minimal constitutional 
scrutiny); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8:96, at 8-158.1 (suggesting that the Supreme Court 
will denominate a mix of advertising, news, social comment and entertainment as 
commercial speech subject to the lower level of constitutional protection.). 
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suffered from depression, and advised that anyone who thought that 
he or she struggled with this illness should seek professional help.  
Assume also that the advertising company controlled a large share of 
the market for antidepressant drugs.  One might argue that this type 
of advertising results in net positive externalities because its subject 
matter is likely to trigger public discussion.193  Moreover, the 
advertiser may not internalize all the benefits from the ads, and for 
this reason, could be prevented by transaction costs from reaching a 
deal with a celebrity.  Finally, it is also unclear whether such a use 
either undermines the celebritys incentives or devaluates her 
likeness.194 
Defendants who play up humor in advertisements, like in the 
White and Allen cases, should perhaps also be protected.195  In the 
latter case, actor-director Woody Allen sought an injunction and 
damages against the defendants for publishing an advertisement in 
which a plaintiff look-alike was seen as a satisfied holder of 
Nationals movie rental V.I.P. Card.196  In the ad, a sort of look-
alikeBoroff was his namewas seen standing at a counter, renting 
videotapes of Allens movies.197  The defendants conceded that 
Boroff looked like the plaintiff but disagreed that they intended to 
imply that the person in the photograph was actually Plaintiff or that 
Plaintiff endorsed National: 
[T]he photograph does not depict Plaintiff.  According to 
defendants, the idea of the advertisement is that even 
people who are not stars are treated like stars at National 
 
 193 See National Institute of Mental Health, The Invisible Disease: Depression, at 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/invisible.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2001) (Major 
depression is the leading cause of disability in the U.S. and worldwide.  Depressive 
disorders affect an estimated 9.5 percent of adult Americans ages 18 and over in a given 
year, or about 18.8 million people in 1998.). 
 194 This line of reasoning may explain Finger v. Omni Publn Intern., Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 
141, 144, where the Court held that use of the Plaintiffs picture in an article on 
experimental fertilization techniques did not infringe their right of publicity.  Of course, a 
Plaintiff may still have a remedy under the law of defamation, or in privacy. 
 195 See supra note 33 (discussing White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.); and Allen v. Natl 
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 196 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617. 
 197 Id. at 618. 
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Video.  They insist that the advertisement depicts a 
Woody Allen fan, so dedicated that he has adopted his 
idols appearance and mannerisms, who is able to live out 
his fantasy by receiving star treatment at National Video.  
The knowing viewer is supposed to be amused that the 
counter person actually believes that the customer is 
Woody Allen.198 
Not having seen the advertisement, it is difficult to assess whether 
the Defendants interpretation was credible or not.  Nonetheless, had 
it featured an adequate disclaimer, the ad may very well have been 
an appropriate transformative use of Woody Allens likeness.199 
The rules presented here resemble what others have proposed for 
the right of publicity.  For example, drawing on trademark law, some 
scholars have argued that unauthorized uses of persona that are 
purely generic or nominative should be allowed.200  Applying this 
distinction, many have claimed that White v. Samsung Electronics 
had been wrongly decided because the manufacturers use of Whites 
identifying characteristics was nominal rather than an appropriation 
of her goodwill.201  These views will often yield similar results to the 
 
 198 See id. The court also noted that Boroff was not perfectly identical to the plaintiff.  
See id. at 624 . 
 199 For the same reasons, Carson v. Heres Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th 
Cir. 1983) is almost certainly wrong.  Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 498 F.2d 821, 
822 (9th Cir. 1974), on the other hand, may not be, because the defendants use falsely 
suggested that the race driver endorsed its products. 
 200 See Kaplan, supra note 50, at 67-68 (the nature of the appropriation (i.e., was the use 
deceptive or so extensive as to be a theft, or, alternatively, was the use informational or 
transformative?) is more important than simply applying the commercial/non-commercial 
test to any use.).  About generic use in trademark law, see, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. 
News Am. Publg, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992); WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Assn, 
926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991).  To the same effect, an author has advocated submitting the 
right of publicity to the condition found in the Restatement of Unfair Competition that the 
defendants use not only conjures up the celebrity to the viewer, but also projects a star 
quality association between the celebrity and the advertised product.  See David S. 
Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the 
Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 93 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, statutory note at 536 (1995). 
 201 See Welkowitz, supra note 200, at 79-82 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit confused 
the means of appropriation  i.e., whether an actual likeness was used  with the purpose 
of appropriation); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an 
Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 
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ones I advocate in this paper, particularly because the supporters of 
genericide recognize that recoding uses do not prevent celebrities 
from endorsing goods and services.  My approach probably also 
comes close to the proposals that have been made to import the 
copyright doctrine of fair use into right of publicity analysis.202 
Finally, Dean Alice Haemmerli has suggested distinguishing 
between uses that identify a plaintiff and those that indirectly evoke 
or remind the public of him.203  Although Dean Haemmerlis 
characterization is fully consistent with her impressive Kantian 
analysis of the right of publicity, it ignores somewhat the economics 
of celebrity marketing.  From an economic standpoint,  there is no 
need for consumers to reach the conclusion that a person is there, 
or that this is X rather than this reminds me of X for the desired 
associations to make their way into their mind.  The effectiveness of 
goodwill transfer may not follow Dean Haemmerlis Kantian 
logic.204 
 
864-66 (1995) (arguing that Samsung had not used Whites characteristics in advertisement 
to identify her and appropriate her goodwill as much as to depict a generic game show letter 
turner).  Support for the position that celebrity identity may become generic has been found 
in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).  In that case, the persona of Ginger 
Rogers and Fred Astaire were clearly evoked by the title of the defendants film, Ginger & 
Fred. Id. at 1001.  Nonetheless, the Court held that First Amendment values protected the 
defendants use of the celebrities names as it was not wholly unrelated to the movie or 
disguised commercial advertisement.  See id. at 1004. 
 202 See Haemmerli, supra note 13, at 464-76.  See also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Assn, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996); Comedy III Prods. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807-8 (Cal. 2001) (although rejecting the wholesale 
importation of the fair use doctrine); Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 
1449 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 203 See Haemmerli, supra note 13, at 459-64.  Dean Haemmerlis careful argument 
focuses on the plaintiff rather than on the extent of the social use of a celebritys identity 
because she develops a personality-based right of publicity. 
 204 To the extent that evocation of a celebrity allows a third party to appropriate her 
magnetism, there is no a priori economic basis for distinguishing between identification and 
evocation.  Imagine, for example, that an advertiser used the words Is that your final 
answer?: Whether this sentence merely evokes the personality of a game show host or 
identifies him, the advertiser is attempting to benefit from Mr. Philbins popularity.  Thus, 
from an economic viewpoint, Dean Haemmerlis argument embraces an overly restrictive 
definition of celebrity persona, and ignores that modern day celebrities cast a halo much 
wider than their Kantian person. 
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IV. DISTRIBUTIVE CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE DEFINITION OF 
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Obviously, the right of publicity described here leaves celebrities 
with less control over their identity; this outcome may hurt our 
sensibilities.  The allusions to fair rewards, unjust enrichment or theft 
that abound in right of publicity cases205 show that we are generally 
concerned with rewarding celebrities for the ways in which they 
enliven our lives.  Yet, if, as media theorists argue, celebrities, their 
publicists, the media, the public and third-party recoders jointly 
produce fame,206 the law should consider how its rewards are 
distributed among all of these parties.  For example, legalizing 
commercial recoding uses would not only allow individuals to enjoy 
more mass-produced celebrity goods and services; it would also 
allow commercial third parties to turn a profit at the expense of 
celebrities.207  Would this result be acceptable? 
Few things might seem as personal as ones fame, and celebrities 
generally see themselves as the sole party entitled to its rewards.208  I 
admit to being skeptical about this distribution of the rewards of 
fame, which I believe to be a social trust.  I also share Michael 
Madows concerns for what he perceived to be the courts 
privatization of popular culture through the commodification and 
appropriation to celebrities of socially constructed meanings.209  In 
economic terms, however, concentrating the rewards of celebrity in 
the exclusive hands of celebrities also imposes significant rent-
seeking costs. 
 
 205 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 206 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 207 McCarthy dismisses the recoding literature on this very basis.  See MCCARTHY, supra 
note 1, § 7.6[B], at 7-29 and § 7:21-22. 
 208 See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996) (describing a certain myth of romantic 
authorship). 
 209 See Madow, supra note 12, at 137-43.  In this respect, a key argument of those who 
favor recoding is that fame is not exclusively the result of a celebritys work: it crucially 
depends on the publics favor.  Id. at 181-96. 
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A. The Problem of Rent-Seeking 
Economic rent is defined as payments made to a factor of 
production in excess of what is required to elicit the supply of that 
factor.210  Economic rent imposes social costs because it creates 
incentives for third parties (rent-seekers) to engage in a costly race 
to capture the apparent windfall.  The larger the economic rent, the 
larger the number of people who will engage in rent-seeking, and the 
greater the sum of money they will expend in doing so.211 
Quite plainly, many celebrities receive substantial economic rent.  
For example, a professional baseball players rent is very large 
because his next most lucrative occupation, as a coach, for example, 
pays much less.212  Most right of publicity plaintiffs are celebrities 
and come from fields of endeavorsthe sports, the arts, the 
entertainment industrywhere few successful individuals command 
a disproportionate share of the income of their calling.213  Indeed, it 
is not uncommon for successful actors and athletes to earn hundreds 
of times the lowest, if not the median, income in their field.214  The 
 
 210 See STIGLITZ, supra note 84, at A3. 
 211 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (5th ed. 1998) 
(discussing the case of salvage at sea).  Economic rent also transfers wealth from consumers 
to producers, in this case celebrities.  This transfer, however, could be justified on the basis 
of some distributive goal or for the purpose of offering greater incentives to stars to perform 
and increase the positive externalities of their activity. 
 212 In fact, it is probable that aspiring celebrities would remain engaged in their field of 
endeavor even if their wages fell below the wages they would receive in their second best 
occupation.  Indeed, athletes, artists, actors and musicians may value fame itself and always 
consider it rewarding to stay in the public eye.  Stated differently, celebrities utility 
functions may incorporate a lexical preference for public consideration; much of their 
motivation may derive from a desire for public consideration rather than from monetary 
rewards.  To this extent, celebrities utility functions of income may be particularly flat 
upward sloping.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 779, 833 (1994) (discussing lexical ordering of preferences). 
 213 Economist Sherwin Rosen has described this superstars phenomenon wherein 
relatively small numbers of people earn enormous amounts of money and seem to dominate 
the fields in which they are engaged.  See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 
AM. SCHOLAR 449 (Autumn 1983).  See also Lex Borghans and Loek Groot, Superstardom 
and Monopolistic Power: Why Media Stars Earn More Than Their Marginal Contribution 
to Welfare, 154 J. INST. AND THEORETICAL ECON. 546 (1998). 
 214 For hard figures from a number of superstar markets, see FRANK & COOK, supra note 
125, at 61-99; Peter Kafka, The Power 100, FORBES, Mar. 20, 2000, at 196. 
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flip side of this phenomenon is that superstars also account for an 
unusually large percentage of the output of their respective industry.  
Indeed, the ease of reproduction of images and sounds in the 
electronic media, the definition of success in relative rather than 
absolute terms, and the fact that greater and lesser talents are 
imperfect substitutes all contribute to superstars dominating their 
respective market.215 
Rent-seeking costs imply that society is worse off even if a 
baseball players economic rent is smaller than the increase in social 
welfare due to his glamorous activity.  In addition, behavioral studies 
have shown that rational persons (let alone celebrity-aspiring youth) 
systematically overestimate ex ante their chances of success in 
activities where odds of winning are slim.216  In these settings, 
psychological biases, in particular availability heuristics, distort what 
would otherwise be rational calculations about ones expectations of 
success.  To the extent that the right of publicity creates additional 
incentives for individuals to enter into crowded lines of work,217 it 
draws a sub-optimally large number of persons to enter into winner-
take-all markets, and it fosters wasteful investment in skills that are 
not scarce.218  In this light, the right of publicitys rent-seeking costs 
 
 215 See Rosen, supra note 213, at 449, 454 (explaining that stars have no perfect 
substitutes); and FRANK & COOK, supra note 125, at 32-44. 
 216 See Jolls et al., supra note 155, at 1477; FRANK & COOK, supra note 125, at 104-5 
(citing a survey of college basketball starters about their chances of success in the 
professional market).  The right of publicity is invoked most often in fields such as sports 
and the arts where the chances of making it are slight. 
 217 For example, the right of publicity contributes to making endorsement contracts 
profitable; as a result, athletes, artists and entertainment figures continue to derive a 
substantial part of their income from the merchandizing of their identity.  Thus, curtailing 
the right of publicity would probably result in lower income for superstars, even if they tried 
to make up by performances what they currently earn in endorsements. See Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability 
Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 107-12  (1994).  Obviously, how much the right of publicity 
contributes to overcrowding depends on the income elasticity of celebrity supply.  If 
merchandizing dollars are concentrated in the hands of a few top earners, however, the 
decreasing marginal utility of money may imply that curtailing the right of publicity would 
not significantly affect the supply of fame. 
 218 To put things more crudely, the right of publicity may dupe teenagers into registering 
for night drama classes because they overestimate their chances of becoming the next Tom 
Hanks.  With its lure of millions of dollars in sponsorship down the road to success, the 
right of publicity may be a cost-effective way to get potential Tom Hanks to work on their 
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are probably important because of the high revenues that superstars 
earn today, the unrelenting media attention that they command,219 
and the common perception that success, if not fame, is not 
impossible for most of us.  Thus, a right of publicity that 
concentrates the rewards of fame in the hands of celebrities entails 
inefficiencies. 
B. Liability Rules as a Solution to Distributive Concerns 
The rules presented in this paper would limit the circumstances 
under which well known celebrities recover, with the consequence 
that others would pocket some of the rewards of fame that were 
previously inaccessible to them.  Moral views about human worth 
and integrity, which I have ignored thus far, may suggest that the 
rewards of fame should rest with right of publicity plaintiffs rather 
than some corporate defendants.  These views are not sufficient to 
reject the rules presented in this paper, however, if protecting 
celebrities with liability rather than property rules can both 
efficiently protect celebrity identities and give celebrities rewards 
that may be thought to be naturally theirs. 
Thirty years ago, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed argued 
that the common law preferred to protect valuable resources with 
property rather than liability rules, a proposition that seems to apply 
to the modern protection of human persona.220  But Calabresi and 
 
acting skills (at least in comparison to a massive investment in drama programs in 
elementary schools.). 
 219 Thus, races to stardom no doubt capture the publics attention more than other rent-
seeking opportunities that have attracted the attention of economists, such as patent races 
and salvage at sea. 
 220 In their landmark article, the authors argued that entitlements to economic resources 
could be protected with property, liability or inalienability rules.  Thus, whereas property 
rules required state involvement for the purpose of protecting entitlements, they did not 
involve the state in assessing the value of assets.  Property entitlements could only be 
transferred voluntarily, implying that only their owners could determine their worth.  By 
contrast, entitlements protected by liability rules necessitated state involvement not only in 
their defense, but also in their valuation when courts were called upon to order the payment 
of damages.  See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L REV. 1089 
(1972). 
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Melamed also showed that liability rules were sometimes preferable 
to property ones, for example, when a large number of buyers 
collectively valued an asset more than its owner but transaction and 
coordination costs were prohibitively high.  This set of circumstances 
is exactly what we have when a celebrity achieves significant fame; 
she becomes a cultural icon venerated by many who may seek to 
recode her.221  In these circumstances, then, liability rules would 
allow celebrities to be compensated for third parties exploiting their 
fame while at the same time allowing socially beneficial expression 
to take place. 
Consider, for example, the case of Martin Luther King, Jr., Center 
for Social Change where the estate of Rev. King and related parties 
sought to enjoin the defendant from selling plastic busts of the civil 
rights leader.222  One might think that the public might have valued a 
memento of the remarkable pastor.  Yet, because the market for these 
busts consisted of a large number of individuals who were probably 
not willing to pay very much for them, the only commercially viable 
exploitation of Rev. Kings profile consisted in plastic statues.  
Where a celebrity has no clear substitutes, as Rev. King probably 
does not, a celebrity has the power to prevent resources from 
reaching their efficient use.  Embracing a liability rule in the King 
case would have allowed the defendant to obtain use of Rev. Kings 
identity  if  it  compensated  the  plaintiffs  for  lost  incentives,223 for  
 
 221 Indeed, it has been observed that [b]ecause property rules give one person the sole 
and absolute power over the use and disposition of a given thing, it follows that its owner 
may hold out for as much as he pleases before selling the thing in question.  See Richard A. 
Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 
2091 (1997).  In many cases, this situation does not entail significant consequences because 
a potential buyer can play one seller against another until a competitive price is reached.  
See id. at 2092.  But this is not the case for most stars who have no perfect substitutes. 
 222 Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 
694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 223 The administratrix of the estate could have argued that the proposed use was 
degrading, although the economic significance of this argument is unclear given that Rev. 
King had passed away.  Is the risk of distasteful commercial exploitation of ones persona 
after death likely to reduce significantly ex ante the incentives to market her identity? 
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interference with their identity management,224 or for any other harm 
they might have suffered. 225 
Similarly, a liability principle would best address cases where a 
celebrity may seek to hold-out because the proposed use, like parody, 
is not flattering although it may be socially valuable.  Consider also 
the Hoffman case where a federal district court awarded $1.5 million 
in damages against a fashion magazine for publishing a movie stars 
picture digitally modified to model clothes, without commentary or 
information.  The District Court held that the defendants behavior 
was not protected by the First Amendment, suggesting that the article 
was an advertisement in disguise because many featured pieces of 
clothing has been designed by major advertisers in the magazine.226  
The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, holding that the magazines 
use was entitled to First Amendment protection. 
From an economic standpoint, Hoffman is a difficult case.  On the 
one hand, the defendants digital mutilation of the plaintiffs likeness 
may have cheapened his identity, and caused him such moral outrage 
as to affect his incentives.  On the other hand, the public does derive 
value from the juxtaposition of the cultural symbols that inheres in 
dressing up Dustin Hoffman in the latest chic; preventing such a 
recoding use is not costless.227  A way to ease a controversy like 
 
 224 One measure of damages in that case would be to afford to the Plaintiff the means to 
correct whatever damage has been caused to its management of Rev. Kings image.  This 
measure of damages has been allowed in unfair competition cases.  See, e.g., Big O Tire 
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1374-6 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 225 See also Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 
508 F. Supp. 854, 865 (N.D. Ga. 1981), where the plaintiffs found the defendants bust of 
Dr. King to be tasteless, and the manner in which it was marketed to be as offensive as it is 
illegal. Should this be sufficient ground to prevent public use?  As the District Court 
observed, an opposing argument, at least equally as strong, can be made that public policy 
requires instead that the name and likeness of Martin Luther King, Jr. be protected as part of 
the public domain. 
 226 This inference was somewhat speculative, however, as the New York Court of 
Appeals found in Stephano v. News Group Publns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 582-83, 586 
(N.Y. 1984) (where the defendant magazine ran the plaintiff models picture a second time 
in a Best Bets column which featured products of the magazines advertisers). 
 227 The commentary that accompanied Hoffmans picture stated, tellingly: What do you 
get when you cross a hopelessly straight starving actor with a dynamite red sequined dress? 
and You get Americas hottest new actress. The editor-in-chief also commented on the 
feature in these terms: . . . The movie stills in our refashioned spectacular, Grand 
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Hoffman would have been to give the plaintiff some measure of 
profits from the defendants activity while denying Hoffman the 
right to enjoin the infringing expression.228 
Liability rules are sometimes criticized on the ground that it is 
difficult for a court or a jury to assess accurately the value of the 
asset in contention, particularly if it is intangible.  As true as this may 
be, a courts glib evaluation is equally likely to underestimate the 
worth of an infringing use.  Furthermore, the difficulty ex ante of 
determining the value of an infringing use does not necessarily mean 
that the task is arbitrary ex post.229  Thus, without undermining the 
seriousness of this argument, a limited application of a liability rule 
may turn out to be useful. 
Roberta Kwall has also suggested protecting human identity with 
liability rather than property rules.230  Our inquiries differ, however, 
in so far as Professor Kwall strives first and foremost to reconcile the 
right of publicity with the First Amendment.  I have reached a 
similar result by focusing on what types of circumstances are likely 
 
Illusions (Page 104), have appeared before  in fact, theyre some of the most famous 
images in Hollywood history.  But youve never seen them quite like this. See Hoffman v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 870-71 (C.D. Cal. 1999).  Note that the 
digitally-altered actors appeared in scenes that had made them famous: on the one hand, 
these images had reached iconic status; on the other, they also had been used extensively to 
advertise the actors work. 
 228 As Hoffman shows, a liability rule would promote First Amendment values.  Indeed, 
no matter how much sympathy the District Court had for Hoffman, it dismissed First 
Amendment considerations too summarily.  Its view that the defendants use was 
commercial and was not privileged because it was false (Los Angeles Magazine fabricated 
an image of Dustin Hoffman using computer digitalization techniques, and then published 
that image knowing it was false) is not convincing.  On the one hand, the Ninth Circuits 
opinion left Hoffman without any compensation for what appears to be a wholesale 
appropriation of his traits.  As the concurrent opinion in Zacchini observed, it is relevant to 
First Amendment balancing whether the plaintiff seeks to repress speech or simply to be 
paid for it.  See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1977).  
Furthermore, protecting human identity with a liability rule is consonant with the First 
Amendments dislike for prior restraints on speech while offering some compensation to the 
subject of identity appropriation, when it occurs in the entertainment media.  See Kwall, 
Liability Rule, supra note 19, at 64. 
 229 See generally Hon. Alex Kozinski, Whats So Fair About Fair Use?, Brace Memorial 
Lecture (Nov. 11, 1999) (proposing the application of this rule to the current fair use 
doctrine). 
 230 See Kwall, supra note 19. 
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to give rise to market failures justifying the adoption of liability 
rules.  Professor Kwalls project is also more circumscribed because 
she does not seek to justify the right of publicity in economic 
terms.231  Nonetheless, I certainly approve of Professor Kwalls 
effort to infuse greater flexibility into the law of publicity. 
CONCLUSION 
I have presented an economic analysis of the law of publicity in 
the hope of clarifying the debate between economic and moral 
arguments which I see as the central issue plaguing the development 
of the right of publicity.  The Supreme Courts view in Zacchini that 
the central policy underlying the right of publicity is to offer 
incentives to people to market their persona further supports the view 
that economic analyses of this legal right are overdue. 
Although the analysis I have proposed does not offer definitive 
answers about what form the right of publicity should take, it casts 
serious doubts on a number of oft-quoted propositions about the 
merit and ideal scope of this legal institution.  Economic analysis 
also suggests that the current right of publicity is overbroad because 
the law ignores that many unauthorized uses of human identity result 
in positive network effects rather than negative externalities.  
Nonetheless, the law should protect celebrity identity because it is a 
repository of social meaning.  Thus, I have argued that a persons 
right in her identity should be limited to enjoining uses that are 
deceptive or that directly compete with the exploitation of her 
persona, without being transformative.  These rules would go a long 
way towards recognizing the social value of recoding, as a creative 
process, as an activity essential to individual identity formation, and 
as an activity essential to the upkeep of fame. 
One could object that my analysis is deficient because it ignores 
moral arguments in favor of the right of publicity, especially those 
about the just desert of plaintiffs and the unjust enrichment of 
defendants.  It is true that moral views about human worth and 
 
 231 See id. at 48. 
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integrity have a role to play in right of publicity cases.  The task I set 
for myself, however, has been to clarify one inescapable class of 
argumentseconomic argumentsabout right of publicity cases in 
order to show that their treatment by courts and commentators is 
most often unsatisfactory.  I have only argued that the ongoing 
propertization of human personae232which parallels a more 
general phenomenon affecting intellectual property rights233 merits 
scrutinization in light of its economic effects.  To this extent, I hope 
that my work will be useful even for those who abhor 
consequentialist analysis. 
One might object that this article has focused unduly on 
celebrities, ignoring cases where the personae of less well known 
people are exploited without their consent.  In the market for 
attention, however, the right of publicity is primarily that of 
celebrities.  Furthermore, to the extent that the most cogent 
distinction between the rights of privacy and publicity consists in 
their different policy rationales (protecting human integrity vs. 
offering incentives to market identity), I would venture that most 
cases involving ordinary peoples likeness are best analyzed as 
breaches of privacy. 
That I have not analyzed moral arguments supporting the right of 
publicity does not imply any opinion about their merit.  Quite to the 
contrary, I share the view that the current application of economic 
analysis to law should be regarded as an interim step toward the 
 
 232 The descriptions of theft and piracy that abound in the case law confirm that judges 
consider the right of publicity to be a form of property.  See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 
(The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straight-forward one of 
preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will quoting from Harry Kalven, Jr., 
Privacy in Tort Law  Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
326, 331 (1966); Midler v. Ford Motor Corp., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(Defendants were no better than the average thief); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Assn., 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996)  (Indeed, allowing MLBPA to 
control or profit from the parody trading cards would actually sanction the theft of 
Cardtoons creative enterprise.). 
 233 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-904 (1997)  (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND 
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)); Pamela 
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing 
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989). 
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integration of law with the behavioral, natural, and social 
sciences.234  In this respect, I hope to have shown that economics 
only questionably supports the current expansive scope of the right 
of publicity.  The implication of this view, if it is correct, is that 
courts must begin articulating what moral views lurk behind their 
decisions.  The right of publicity must evolve beyond a jurisprudence 
of fair rewards and embrace explicit standards of adjudication. 
 
 
 234 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and 
Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1314 (1986). 
